Intersubjectivity and Second-Person Perspective

Abstract

At various points in the preceding chapters I started to draw arrows that were directed at this topic of intersubjectivity. I’m not sure that this is the best topic to save until last. It’s implicated in many ways in the various topics covered in previous chapters, so it might seem that I’ve been dancing around something important. Now it’s time, in this chapter to engage in a serious tango, that is, to step into a hands-on, face-to-face encounter with the issue of intersubjectivity. A n account of intersubjectivity is needed to support various claims about phenomenological methodology — specifically claims about the possibility of intersubjective validity. It’s also needed to motivate the enactive conception of intentionality outlined in Chapter 4, and the accounts of action and narrative in Chapter 8. Most importantly, however, phenomenology requires an account of intersubjectivity simply, but also significantly, because it is a central theme and phenomenon of human experience.