Abstract
In this chapter I argue that the military’s attempt to instill in its soldiers a willingness to commit deadly violence morally harms them. This harm provides the impetus for a virtue ethical argument for pacifism. Soldiers are systematically trained to kill both through technical training, related to the proper handling of weapons, and through well-established psychological techniques, which are aimed at disabling empathetic responses and overcoming the resistance to killing. The military’s psychological training involves habituating soldiers in order to make them effective killers through the use of what Albert Bandura has called “mechanisms of moral disengagement.”1 One prominent mechanism involves dehumanizing of the enemy, by causing a soldier either to fail to consider the enemy as a human or to consider the enemy to be somehow less than human.2 I argue that the resistance to killing has moral significance for the development of virtue and, thus, that attempts to suppress the resistance can adversely affect one’s character. I further argue that the suppression of the resistance to killing is irresponsible since it cannot be done with enough fineness of grain to forestall inappropriate violence. Since training soldiers to kill and sending them into battle involves intentionally forming them in ways that are harmful to their characters and to their overall life prospects, I conclude that, on virtue ethical grounds, one should endorse contingent pacifism — a very strong presumption against the use of military force.
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Notes
See A. Bandura (1999) “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities” Personality and Social Psychology Review 3, 193–209.
D. Grossman (1995) On Killing: The Psychological Cost of learning to Kill in War and Society (Little, Brown & Co.: Boston), 156–70.
S. L. A. Marshall (2000 [1947]) Men Against Fire: TheProblem of Battle Command (University of Oklahoma Press: Norman), 54.
S. Milgram (1974) Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper and Row).
Grossman, On Killing, p. 4. On a soldier’s fear of killing, see N. Sherman (2005) Stoic Warriors (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 118–22.
They are a small subset of people (estimated 1–2%), for whom the resistance is absent, and who, by definition, have no inhibitions about harming other humans. R. Collins (2008) Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory (Princeton University Press: Princeton)
See e.g. E. Diener, J. Dineen, K. Endresen, A.L. Beaman, & S.C. Fraser (1975) “Effects of Altered Responsibility, Cognitive Set, and Modeling on Physical Aggression and Deindividuation”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31, 328–337.
R. L. Ivie (1980) “Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War”, Communication Monographs 47, 270–294.
B. Shalit (1988) The Psychology of Conflict and Combat (New York: Praeger Publishers), 48
S. Keen (1986) Faces of the Enemy (New York: Harper & Row)
H. C. Kelman (1973) “Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers“, Journal of Social Issues 29, 25–61.
E. Staub (1989) The Roots of Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 100–8.
I have no space here to engage in the debate about the empirical adequacy of such traits. However, in my view, the situationist critique (J. Doris (1998) Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press))
G. Sreenivasan (2002) “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution”, Mind 111, 47–68
R. Kamtekar (2004) “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character”, Ethics 114, 458–91
J. Sabini and M. Silver (2005) “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued.” Ethics 115, 535–62
N. Snow (2010) Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory (New York: Routledge).
See N. Snow (2000) “Empathy”, American Philosophical Quarterly 37: 65–78.
J. Coke, C. Batson and K. McDavis (1978) “Empathic Mediation of Helping: A Two-stage Model”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36, 752–66
C. Batson and J. S. Coke. (1981) “Empathy: A Source of Altruistic Motivation for Helping?” In J. P. Rushton and R. M. Sorrentino (eds), Altruism and Helping behavior (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum Associates) 167–87
Batson, C. (1991) The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-psychological Answer (Hillsdale: Erlbaum)
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See also D. R. Richardson, G. S. Hammock, S. M. Smith, W. Gardner, and M. Signo (1994) “Empathy as a Cognitive Inhibitor of Interpersonal Aggression”, Aggressive behavior 20, 275–89
L. L. Shaw, CD. Batson, and R. M. Todd (1994) “Empathy Avoidance: Forestalling Feeling for Another in Order to Escape the Motivational Consequences”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67, 879–87.
Aristotle (1999) Nicomachean Ethics [EN], transi. T. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett)
See, e.g. K. R. Henning and B. Frueh (1997) “Combat Guilt and its Relationship to PTSD Symptoms”, Journal of Clinical Psychology 53, 801–8
G. Owens et al. (2009) “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Guilt, Depression, and Meaning in Life Among Military Veterans”, Journal of Traumatic Stress 22, 654–7.
For a classic exposition, see M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (2006) 4th edn (New York: Basic Books).
J. McMahan (2009) Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
K. von Clausewitz (1976) On War, transi. M. Howard and P. Paret (Oxford: Oxford World Classics), 15
Y. Elizur and N. Yishay-Krien (2009) “Participation in Atrocities among Israeli Soldiers during the First Intifada: A Qualitative Analysis”, Journal of Peace Research 46, 251–67
See, e.g., J. C. Beckham, S. D. Moore, & V. Reynolds (2000) “Interpersonal Hostility and Violence in Vietnam Combat Veterans with Chronic Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Review of Theoretical Models and Empirical Evidence”, Aggression and Violent behavior 5, 451–66
C. T. Taft et al. (2005) “Risk Factors for Partner Violence among a National Sample of Combat Veterans”, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 73, 151–9
C. T. Taft, et al. (2007) “Aggression among Combat Veterans: Relationships with Combat Exposure and Symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Dysphoria, and Anxiety”, Journal of Traumatic Stress 20, 135–45.
Psychopaths lack a core ability to empathize and the resistance to killing, such that, when it comes to killing, they are ruthless and remorseless. See R. J. R. Blair (2007) “Empathic Dysfunction in Psychopathic Individuals”, In T. F. D. Fanow and P. W. R. Woodruff (eds) Empathy in Mental Illness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 3–16.
B. Williams (1978) “Politics and Moral Character”, in S. Hampshire (ed.), Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 55–74.
On tragic situations, see R. Hursthouse (1999) On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford university Press).
B. Williams (1993) “Moral Luck”, in D. Statman (ed.) Moral Luck. (Albany: State University of New York Press) 35–55.
See L. May (2011) “Contingent Pacifism and the Moral Risks of Participating in War”, Public Affairs Quarterly 25, 95–111.
May”, Contingent Pacifism and the Moral Risks of Participating in War”; L. May (2012) “Contingent Pacifism and Selective Refusal”, Journal of Social Philosophy 43, 1–18.
A. Fiala (2008) The fust War Myth: The Moral Illusions of War (New York: Rowman and Littlefield), 61–73.
J. Annas (2008) “Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism”, in P. Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 205–21.
See N. Snow (2009) “How Ethical Theory Can Improve Practice: Lessons From Abu Ghraib”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12, 555–68.
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© 2013 Franco V. Trivigno
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Trivigno, F.V. (2013). A Virtue Ethical Case for Pacifism. In: Austin, M.W. (eds) Virtues in Action. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137280299_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137280299_7
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