Abstract
We humans aren’t very nice to each other — especially when we discuss controversial topics. We speak too quickly and too loudly. We don’t listen. We’re unfair. We put our own views in the best light, and our dissenters’ views in the worst. These tendencies are extremely common, and they transcend economic, religious, and political boundaries. If you doubt this, ask yourself whether the people on “the other side” of your favorite controversial issue are always reasonable and fair-minded. You may well think they aren’t. Perhaps they are the ones ruining the discussion. But of course they probably think similar thoughts about the people on your side. This suggests that most of us think that humans treat each other poorly when we discuss controversial issues. Those most familiar with our public discourse share this impression. In a recent article on the state of political discourse, New York Times writer Andrew Rosenthal quips, “There’s lots of evidence that the national conversation is near the ocean floor.”1
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Notes
Other sources of help include R. Ritchhart (2002) Intellectual Character: What it is, Why it Matters, and How to Get it (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass)
D. Howard-Snyder, R Howard-Snyder and R. Wasserman (2009) The Power of Logic (New York: McGraw Hill)
R. Roberts and J. Wood (2007) Intellectual Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press)
J. Baehr (2011) The Inquiring Mind: On the Intellectual Virtues & Virtue Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press).
J. Locke (1983) A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James Tully (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing), 51.
For a detailed development of this line of thought, see T. Kelly (2005) “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, in J. Hawthorne and T. Szabo-Gendler (eds) Oxford Studies in Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press), 167–96.
R. Feldman (2006) “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement”, in S. Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures (New York: Oxford University Press)
D. Christensen (2009) “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy”, Philosophy Compass 4, 756–67.
See the discussion of Abelson’s work in T. Gilovich (1991) How We Know What Isn’t So (New York: The Free Press), 85–87.
C. Tavris and E. Aronson (2007) Mistakes Were Made (but not by me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts (New York: Harcourt), 13.
L. Festinger (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson)
See L. Ross and R. Nisbett (1991) The Person and the Situation (New York: McGraw Hill).
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© 2013 Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King
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Garcia, R.K., King, N.L. (2013). Getting Our Minds Out of the Gutter: Fallacies that Foul Our Discourse (and Virtues that Clean it Up). In: Austin, M.W. (eds) Virtues in Action. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137280299_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137280299_13
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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