Abstract
On the morning of 6 October 2000, it was obvious to all involved that the military had played an important role in facilitating the overthrow of Milošević. The tanks did not roll onto the streets to shore up the crumbling regime, and the generals refused to obey some of the more destructive orders given by Milošević in his moments of despair.1 That this happened through inaction rather than through a concerted effort by the top brass to intervene only served to underline the fact that the military was an independent actor that the new democratic authorities would have to learn to control in order to help consolidate democracy. In order to do that they would need to tackle a number of aspects of the civil-military relations dynamic inherited from Slobodan Milošević’s era.
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Notes
Ibid. A year later, the VJ would publish a book with a collection of orders from both commanders in order to show that their actions were strictly in accordance with International Law of Armed Conflict. See Ivan Markovic (ed.), Yugoslav Army and Kosovo and Metohija 1998–1999: Application of the Rules of the International Law of Armed Conflicts, 2nd enlarged edn (Belgrade: Vojno-Izdavcki Zavod, 2002).
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© 2013 James Gow and Ivan Zveržhanovski
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Gow, J., Zverzžhanovski, I. (2013). De-Politicisation and Transition Delayed. In: Security, Democracy and War Crimes. New Security Challenges Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137276148_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137276148_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-44653-7
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