Abstract
As social capital assets and agents of public policy, nonprofits are not passive purveyors of the public’s will. Some seek to shape that will and to influence the policies that are promulgated in the name of the public. This chapter is about nonprofits as promoters of specific policy positions. Chapters 1–5 reminded us that a nonprofit association is a form of structural social capital formed by individuals with common interests and in which transactions among them are embedded with common understanding, objectives, trust, and a cooperative motivation to achieve a common goal and to take collective action to promote a common goal. Collective action need not be unanimous.
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Bryce, H.J. (2012). Policy Formulation, Nonprofit Advocacy, and the Principal-Agent Framework. In: Players in the Public Policy Process. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137273925_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137273925_8
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