• Clayton Crockett
  • Jeffrey W. Robbins
Part of the Radical Theologies book series (RADT)


Thinking is an emergent property that issues from a brain. The brain is the material matrix of thought. Thought itself is material, although it is an incredibly subtle form of matter-energy. We extended the metaphor of the brain in the last chapter to encompass all forms of self-organization; however, the animal brain is the most complex phenomenon we know. The brain is an extraordinarily complex, self-organized structure that generates emotions, consciousness, feeling, and thinking. In an evolutionary sense, this incredible complexity is partly derived from the predatory nature of the animal, which cannot directly convert solar energy into efficient work, but must hunt, gather, herd, or grow other forms of animal and plant life to consume the carbohydrates stored within them that originate with bacteria that then enable plant photosynthesis.


Human Thought Philosophical Logic Brain Plasticity Syllogistic Reasoning Continental Philosophy 
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© Clayton Crockett & Jeffrey W. Robbins 2012

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  • Clayton Crockett
  • Jeffrey W. Robbins

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