South Korea and Poland: Tough Talk, Small Steps, Contested Outcomes

  • Dan Hough
Part of the Political Corruption and Governance series book series (PCG)


The situations of South Korea and Poland are very different to those of Bangladesh and Kenya. As in the latter two states, corruption remains a prominent feature of public discourse in both South Korea and Poland, but it has not prevented both states from making, at times, impressive economic progress. This is not to say that corruption facilitated economic development, but it certainly did not throttle growth in the way that it has done in many states around the world and, indeed, in the way that much of the traditional literature on corruption says that it should. The literature on the effects of corruption has subsequently been (somewhat paradoxically) enriched by the apparently awkward cases of states such as South Korea (and some of its East Asian neighbours) and Poland.1


Political Elite Corrupt Practice Governance Score Investigative Power Tough Talk 
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Copyright information

© Dan Hough 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dan Hough
    • 1
  1. 1.University of SussexUK

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