Bangladesh and Kenya: Tough Talk, Small Steps, Ineffectual Outcomes

  • Dan Hough
Part of the Political Corruption and Governance series book series (PCG)


Tackling corruption in states with low quality governance regimes is, to put it mildly, challenging. This chapter illustrates this by looking at two cases — Bangladesh and Kenya — that, whilst in many ways are very different, have faced broadly similar sets of governance dilemmas. Indeed, there are a number of good reasons to compare and contrast their respective fortunes. First and foremost, both countries have serious, long-standing and deeply embedded corruption problems. The challenges they face are therefore similarly large. Both countries have also experienced periods of authoritarian rule, but both are now (imperfect) multi-party democracies. Both remain predominantly rural, have similar per capita income and economic structures and are former British colonies.1 There are therefore good reasons for comparing and contrasting their performances in terms of tackling corruption.


Corruption Perception Index Electoral Commission Governance Score Grand Corruption Financial Intelligence Unit 
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Copyright information

© Dan Hough 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dan Hough
    • 1
  1. 1.University of SussexUK

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