Abstract
As discussed in chapter 2, being Muslim has multiple meanings that are entangled in a complex web of ethnic, regional, and national identities, and cannot be reduced to a set of beliefs, practices, or, even, cultural norms. For this reason, predefined attributes of religiosity, such as mosque attendance or prayer, are not the best predictors of religiosity.
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Notes
R. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 79.
T. Skocpol and M. P. Fiorina, Civic Engagement in American Democracy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), 344.
In analyzing American Protestant groups, the article by L. Beyerlein and J. R. Hipp, “From Pews to Participation: The Effect of Congregation Activity and Context on Bridging Civic Engagement,” Social Problems 43(1) (2006): 97–117, explains a bit further that not only are religious services correlated to political and civic participation but also to the nature of the congregation. The congregation, outside of its religious function, is a social atmosphere that engenders social networks, exposes people to information, and cultivates leadership skills. The nature of the congregation and the behavior, not so much the belief of the religion, is what connects religiosity with political and civic participation in this survey.
A. Jamal, “The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque Involvement and Group Consciousness,” American Politics Research 33(4) (2005): 25–44.
There are a few exceptions, however, such as a German study (zoii) that showed that individual religiosity and regional, religious context influence social trust. See J. Delhey and K. Newton, “Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism?,” European Sociological Review 21 (2005): 311–327. Specifically, Protestant personal identity in resonance with national culture increased social trust, because the scope of the moral communities went beyond the religious in group and was embedded in the mainstream collective identity. Such a correlation between religious values and mainstream political culture has been confirmed by other surveys conducted in several countries where Protestantism is the dominant religion. Additionally, the former study demonstrates that congregational membership is a predictor of social trust in Germany, noting, “People who are actively involved in their religious community and, therefore, well integrated in religious networks display higher levels of trust.” This level of social trust was highest among Catholics but Protestants still scored higher than Muslims, members of small Christian groups, and people who declared themselves nonreligious.
J. Solomos, “Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe: Making Multicultural Democracy Work?” Ethnic andRacial Studies 34(2)(2011): 363–364
H. I. Ajala, “The Muslim Vote and Muslim Lobby in France: Myths and Realities,“ Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 12(2) (2010): 84. “Voter registration is much lower for the French of African or Turkish origin, especially for younger people: 23 percent say they are not registered whereas this figure is just 7 percent for Algerians” (79).
E. Fieldhouse and D. Cutts, “Diversity, Density, and Turnout: The Effect of Neighborhood Ethno-religious Composition on Voter Turnout in Britain Political Geography,” Political Geography 27(5) (2008): 530–548.
Putnam argues that diversity “seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation,” famously saying that “people living in an ethnically diverse setting appear to ‘hunker down’—that is, to pull in like a turtle.” He calls this the “Constrict Theory,” differentiating himself from Contact Theory, defined above. Furthermore, Putnam argues that diversity does not lead to race problems or ethnically defined hostility (conflict school) but rather to a withdrawal from collective life (see R. Putnam, “E pluribus unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture,” Scandinavian Political Studies 30 (2007): 137–174. It should be noted, however, that Putnam limits his argument to the “short-term,” as he contends that the negative effects of diversity can, and hopefully will, be countered by a gradual reconstruction of social indent itself, which in short, is a redefinition of what diversity means. Ultimately, he suggests that a new, all-encompassing identity may be created that could mesh what is now considered a variety of distinct ethnic-religious identities into one identity.
C. Kesler and I. Bloemraad, “Does Immigration Erode Social Capital?,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 43(2) (2010): 319–347
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© 2013 Jocelyne Cesari
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Cesari, J. (2013). Religiosity, Political Participation, and Civic Engagement. In: Why the West Fears Islam. Culture and Religion in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137121202_4
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