Skip to main content

Part of the book series: The Economics of the Middle East ((TECMIE))

  • 236 Accesses

Abstract

In a world with no uncertainty and perfect markets, where all inputs are divisible, there would be no room for tenancy in agriculture (Nabi 1985). In a perfect world, landless peasants could borrow money without collateral and purchase their own land, as opposed to being sharecroppers. In such a neoclassical world, the existence of tenancies could be explained only by the historical evolution of institutions. In the real world, however, markets are imperfect. Some factors of production are indivisible and/or not easy to market, such as cattle, machinery, and management skills. Furthermore, uncertainties exist due to weather and nature and those related to the labor market. As a result of market imperfections and the uncertainties of agricultural production, tenancy has become an important production arrangement in developing-country agriculture (Braverman and Stiglitz 1982; Byres 1983; Nabi 1985; Otsuka et al. 1993; Dasgupta et al. 1999).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Bardhan, Pranab. K. 1980. “Interlocking Factor Markets and Agrarian Development: A Review of Issues.” Oxford Economic Papers New Series 32(1): 82–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bardhan, Pranab. K. and T. N. Srinivasan. 1971. “Cropsharing Tenancy in Agriculture: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” The American Economic Review 61(1): 48–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bell, Clive and Pinhas Zusman. 1976. “A Bargaining Theoretic Approach to Cropsharing Contracts.” The American Economic Review 66(4): 578–88.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bhaduri, Amit. 1973. “A Study in Agricultural Backwardness Under SemiFeudalism.” Economic Journal 83(329): 120–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhaduri, Amit. 1983. “Sharecropping as a Labor Process, Size of Farm and Supervision Cost.” In Sharecropping and Sharecroppers, edited by T. J. Byres, 88–93. London: Frank Cass and Company

    Google Scholar 

  • Boserup, Esther. 1965. The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braverman, Avishay and Joseph Stiglitz. 1982. “Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets.” The American Economic Review 72(4): 695–715.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byres, Terence J. 1983. “Historical Perspectives on Sharecropping.” In Sharecropping and Sharecroppers, edited by Terence J. Byres, 7–42. London: Frank Cass and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cheung, Steven N. S. 1969. Theory of Share Tenancy. London W.C. I.: University of Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dasgupta, Siddharta, Thomas O. Knight, and Alan H. Love. 1999. “Evolution of Agricultural Land Leasing Models: A Survey of the Literature.” Review of the Agricultural Economics 21(1): 148–76.

    Google Scholar 

  • Douglas, Allen and Dean Lueck. 1992. “Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent Versus Crop Share.” Journal of Law and Economics 35(2): 397–426.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eswaran, Mukesh and Ashok Kotwal. 1985. “A Theory of Two Tier Labor Markets in Agrarian Economics.” The American Economic Review 75(1): 162–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Filmer, Deon and Lant Pritchett. 2001. “Estimating Wealth Effects without Expenditure Data—Or Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in States of India.” Demography 38(1): 115–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Griffin, Keith, Aziz Khan, and Amy Ickowitz. 2002. “Poverty and Distribution of Land.” Journal of Agrarian Change 2(3): 279–330.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, D. Gale. 1950. “Resource Allocation Under Share Contracts.” The Journal of Political Economy 58(2): 111–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keyder, Caglar. 1983. “The Cycle of Sharecropping and the Consolidation of Small Peasant Ownership in Turkey.” In Sharecropping and Sharecroppers, edited by Terence J. Byres, 133–45. London: Frank Cass and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knight, F. 1957. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. New York: Kelley and Millan Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koymen, Oya. 1999. “Cumhuriyet Doneminde Tarimsal Yapi ve Tarim Politikalari.” In 75 Yilda Koylerden Sehirlere, edited by Oya Baydar, 1–6. Istanbul: TC Is BankasiYayinlari, Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koymen, Oya. and O. Meric. 1999. “Turkiye’de Toprak Dagilimi Ustune Bazi Notlar.” In 75 Yilda Koylerden Sehirlere, edited by Oya Baydar, 75–80. Istanbul: TC Is Bankasi Yayinlari, Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martinez-Alier, J. 1983. “Sharecropping Some Illustrations” In Sharecropping and Sharecroppers, edited by Terence. J. Byres, 95–105. London: Frank Cass and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mazumdar, Dipak. 1975. “Theory of Sharecropping with Labor Market Dualism.” Economica 42(167): 261–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mduma, John K. and Peter Wobst. 2005. “Determinants of Rural Labor Market Participation in Tanzania.” African Studies Quarterly 8(1): 32–47. Accessed on July 1, 2006, available at: http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i2a2.htm

    Google Scholar 

  • Morvadiri, Behrooz. 1992. “Gender Relations in Agriculture: Women in Turkey.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 40(3): 567–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nabi, Ijaz. 1985. “Rural Factor Market Imperfections and the Incidence of Tenancy in Agriculture.” Oxford Economic Papers, New Series 37(2): 319–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Newbery, David M. G. 1977. “Risk Sharing, Sharecropping and Uncertain Labor Markets.” The Review of Economic Studies44(3): 585–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Otsuka, Keijiro and Yujiro Hayami. 1988. “Theories of Share Tenancy: A Critical Survey.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 37(1): 31–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Otsuka, Keijiro, Hiroyuki Chuma, and Yujiro Hayami. 1992. “Land and Labor Contracts in Agrarian Economics: Theories and Facts.” Journal of Economic Literature 30(4): 1965–2018.

    Google Scholar 

  • Otsuka, Keijiro, Hiroyuki Chuma, and Yujiro Hayami. 1993. “Permanent Labor and Land Tenancy Contracts in Agrarian Economies: An Integrated Analysis.” Economica, New Series 60(237): 57–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Patnaik, Utsa. 1983. “Classical Theory of Rent and Its Application to India: Some Preliminary Propositions with Some Thoughts on Sharecropping.” In Sharecropping and Sharecroppers, edited by Terence. J. Byres, 71–87 London: Frank Cass and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pearce, R. 1983. “Sharecropping Towards a Marxist View.” In Sharecropping and Sharecroppers, edited by Terence. J. Byres, 42–70. London: Frank Cass and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • QHS. 2002. Quantitative Household Survey. Ministry of Agriculture, ARIP office, Ankara Turkey.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rao, J. Mohan. 2005. “The Forms of Monopoly Land Rent and Agrarian Organization.” Journal of Agrarian Change 4(2): 161–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sen, Abhijit. 1981. “Market Failure and Control of Labor Power: Towards an Explanation of ‘Structure’ and Change in Indian Agriculture.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 5(3–4): 201–28 and 327–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, Adam. 1994. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Toronto: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, Joseph. 1974. “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping.” Review of Economic Studies 41(2): 219–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • TUIK. 2011. Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu. “Is Istatistikleri.” Accessed on September 10, 2011, available at: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=25&ust_id=8

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 2012 Fatma Gül Ünal

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ünal, F.G. (2012). Sharecropping or Fixed-Rent Tenancy?. In: Land Ownership Inequality and Rural Factor Markets in Turkey. The Economics of the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137110886_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics