Abstract
It was the sudden disappearance of American scholarly publications on nuclear fission in the early 1940s that alerted Soviet scientists to the secret American nuclear weapons program. Georgi Flerov, a Soviet nuclear physicist, wrote a letter to Stalin in 1942 and warned him that this conspicuous silence could only mean that the Americans were working on a nuclear bomb.1 Intelligence soon confirmed Flerov’s suspicion, and in early 1943, the Soviet Union initiated its own nuclear weapons project. Shrouded in secrecy, the Soviet state set up organizations and facilities supporting an army of nuclear scientists and engineers, who developed and mastered fission and fusion devices soon after their American counterparts. The ground work was laid for a nuclear arms race that would soon escalate. Yet another race started in 1954, with the launch of a Soviet nuclear power plant—named “The World’s First.” This race was about capturing the public’s imagination, and providing a vision of what the “peaceful applications” of nuclear energy might bring to the world. Popular media were key instruments to disseminate such visions to the public, in the Soviet case perhaps even more consciously so than elsewhere. Since the October revolution in 1917, the young Soviet state had continuously fine-tuned its mass media system to reach all citizens, and to enroll each and every one of them into the “construction of communism in one country.”
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David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939–1956 (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1994)
Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder et al.: Westview Press, 1995).
Ellen Mickiewicz, Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 27.
Mickiewicz, Split signals, 27–28; Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 147.
Gayle D. Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda since Stalin (New York, Washington, and London: Praeger, 1972), 52.
Mickiewicz, Split signals; see also Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2011).
Gayle D. Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda since Stalin (New York, Washington, London: Praeger, 1972), 36.
Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, “Critical Letters to the Editors of the Soviet Press: Social Characteristics and Interrelations of Critics and the Criticized,” American Sociological Review 18 (1953): 12–22
Alex Inkeles, Social Change in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 266; Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination, 37–38, 44.
Stalin’s order came in 1950, just after the first A-bomb test, but still before the first Soviet H-bomb detonated. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb; Kurchatov v zhizni: Pis’ma, dokumenty, vospominaniia, Raisa V. Kuznetsova, ed. (Moscow: Izd-vo ob”edineniia “Mosgorarkhiv,” 2002)
Viktor A. Sidorenko, ed. Istoriia atomnoi energetiki Sovetskogo Soiuza i Rossii, vol. 1 (Moscow: IzdAt, 2001), 5–15
Vladimir G. Asmolov et al., Atomnaia energetika: Otsenki proshlogo, realii nastoiashchego, ozhidaniia budushchego (Moscow: IzdAt, 2004), 8, 12
Lev A. Kochetkov, ed. Ot Pervoi v Mire AES k atomnoi energetike XXI veka: Sbornik tezisov, dokladov i soobshchenii. Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference, June 28–July 2, 1999, Obninsk (Obninsk: Iadernoe obshchestvo Rossii, 1999).
Paul R. Josephson, Red Atom: Russia’s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (New York: Freeman & Co., 1999).
See also Paul R. Josephson, “Rockets, Reactors, and Soviet Culture,” in Science and the Soviet Social Order, ed. Loren Graham (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1990), 174
Paul R. Josephson, “Atomic- Powered Communism: Nuclear Culture in the Postwar USSR,” Slavic Review 55 (1996): 322
Paul R. Josephson, “Atomic Energy and ‘Atomic Culture’ in the USSR: The Ideological Roots of Economic and Safety Problems Facing the Nuclear Power Industry after Chernobyl,” in Soviet Social Problems, ed. T. Anthony Jones, David Powell, and Walter Connor (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 55–77.
For an argument on the pervasiveness of cynicism in the Brezhnevera Soviet Union, see, for example, Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
For a counterargument based on specialists in the Soviet nuclear industry, see Sonja D. Schmid, “Envisioning a Technological State: Reactor Design Choices and Political Legitimacy in the Soviet Union and Russia” (PhD diss., Cornell University, NY, 2005).
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© 2012 Dick van Lente
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Schmid, S.D. (2012). Shaping the Soviet Experience of the Atomic Age: Nuclear Topics in Ogonyok, 1945–1965. In: van Lente, D. (eds) The Nuclear Age in Popular Media. Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137086181_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137086181_2
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