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Minister but Still a Soldier

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Raúl Castro and Cuba

Part of the book series: Studies of the Americas ((STAM))

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Abstract

The situation in early January 1959 requires some description at this stage. The Batista army, Guardia Rural, police and security services were still formally in existence although essentially broken as fighting forces. The US embassy in Havana was still divided as to how best to handle the arrival of Fidel and his barbudos in the capital although Washington was moving towards physical elimination of the problem as the best solution.1 The oligarchy was troubled but largely passive, hoping doubtless to control any potential reform excesses the still largely unknown Fidel might be planning—although this was already starting to look difficult with Fidel’s repeated calls for vast and sweeping change in Cuba as he spoke at various mass meetings on his way to Havana. The bulk of the middle class appears to have been of guarded support for someone they tended to see as radical but not a major threat to those economically below the traditional ruling elite. And the peasantry and the working classes, to the extent they had a voice, were little less than ecstatic about the reformers getting to power.

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Notes

  1. Tad Szulc, Fidel: a Critical Portrait, (New York: Avon, 1986), 479– 484

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  2. Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994)

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  3. Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). This refers to the bearded state of many of the rebels who had fought in the mountains and in the harsh plains campaigns of the invasion. Barbudos means “bearded ones” in Spanish.

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  4. Francisco Castillo Meléndez, La Defensa de la isla de Cuba en la segunda mitad del siglo XVII (Sevilla: Padura, 1996). See also Roberto Antonio Hernández Suárez, Ejército colonial en Cuba, 1561–1725 (Havana: Verde Olivo, 2011), 19–34.

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  5. Enrique Acevedo, Descamisado, (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 2002), especially 243 and 283. See also Szulc, Fidel, 483. For Fidel’s own views and his admission that the handling of the trials was an error, see Ignacio Ramonet, Cien horas con Fidel, (Havana: Consejo de Estado, 2003), 250–253.

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  6. See the interesting comparisons between Fidel and Che on these matters in the first chapters of Paul Dosal, Comandante Che: Guerrilla Soldier, Commander and Strategist, 1956–1967 (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).

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  7. See Luis M. Buch Rodríguez and Reinaldo Suárez Suárez, Otros pasos del gobierno revolucionario cubano (Havana, Ciencias Sociales, 2002), 219–223.

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  8. See Juan Carlos Rodríguez, Girón: la batalla inevitable (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 2005), 86.

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  9. See many personal accounts of those days in Luis Báez, Secretos de generales (Barcelona: Lozada, 1997).

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  10. See Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971), 1237–1244.

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  11. Claudia Furiati, Fidel Castro: la historia me absolverá, (Barcelona: Plaza Janés, 2003), 421–422.

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  12. For the official story of MININT and Seguridad del Estado, see Cuba, Ministerio del Interior, Las Reglas del juego: 30 años de la seguridad del estado, 2 vol. (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1992).

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  13. The official relationship was not always smooth. Even the ferocious critic of Castro, Brigadier-General Rafael del Pino, the FAR’s most senior defector, has said Cuban-Soviet military relations were “indifferent and at times antagonistic. They [the Soviets] do not have the slightest influence on the decisions Cubans make.” Quoted in Jay Mallin, History of the Cuban Armed Forces: from Colony to Castro (Reston, VI: Ancient Mariners Press, 2000), 333.

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  14. For a pictorial and textual idea of this, see Cuba, Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de la República de Cuba (Havana: Editorial Orbe, 1976).

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© 2012 Hal Klepak

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Klepak, H. (2012). Minister but Still a Soldier. In: Raúl Castro and Cuba. Studies of the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137043115_2

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