Sustaining Mobilization in an Atomic Age

Abstract

Shortly following the United States’ atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Japan’s subsequent surrender in August 1945, Science Service’s staff writer, Frank Thone, contemplated the future of international relations. Gunpowder had once ended centuries of feudalism, Thone argued, and the United States’ harnessing of atomic power resulted from enormous financial investments and remarkable intellectual capital. He therefore predicted that only the wealthiest nations could realize atomic technology: “If cannon were the final argument of kings, atomic power is the last word of great powers.” Aside from the United States and Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China could ultimately develop atomic weapons, which would become catastrophic if political relations deteriorated. For this reason alone, Thone urged, “it would seem the better part of sanity, to look and hope for a turning of all powers, great as well as small, along the road of peace made possible at last by an abundance of power for all.” ¹ Watson Davis echoed Thone’s admonition several months later: “How successfully this situation is handled from an international standpoint will largely determine whether the world will have another war in 10 to 25 years.” ²