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Proof, Probability or Plausibility

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The History and Philosophy of Polish Logic

Part of the book series: History of Analytic Philosophy ((History of Analytic Philosophy))

Abstract

The philosophical literature is full of discussions of proof, inductive and deductive plus a multiple of variations on each. What is proof good for?

The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking.

Albert Einstein

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Authors
  1. Joseph Agassi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Geneva, Switzerland

    Kevin Mulligan

  2. Jagiellonian University, Poland

    Katarzyna Kijania-Placek  & Tomasz Placek  & 

Copyright information

© 2014 Joseph Agassi

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Agassi, J. (2014). Proof, Probability or Plausibility. In: Mulligan, K., Kijania-Placek, K., Placek, T. (eds) The History and Philosophy of Polish Logic. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137030894_6

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