“No Partner for Peace”

Abstract

Netanyahu did everything he could to slow down the Oslo process. The Palestinian leadership warned Israel repeatedly of the consequences of this behavior, but in vain. Would Barak, the new prime minister as of July 1999, be able to change this? In this chapter we will see how Barak’s perception of reality led to war and how the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) began using the strategies of a new war. We will also demonstrate the crucial role played by the settlers in pushing for a military solution. Even though Barak styled himself as Yitzhak Rabin’s successor (to the dismay of Rabin’s family), he tried to remedy what many in Israel, particularly the militaristic-religious society, viewed as a major mistake by Rabin: the fact that he ignored the settlers’ needs and feelings. Barak sought to find a compromise with them about the removal of the illegal outposts they had set up on West Bank hilltops. Under the terms of the agreement that was reached, the majority of these mini-settlements were to remain intact, despite the demands by the United States and Israeli civil society activists for their removal. ¹ For Barak, the agreement was a key achievement, reflecting his declared ambition to be the “prime minister of ev-ery-one,” as he put it. By accepting most of the settlers’ demands, Barak in fact continued the failed policy of Shimon Peres in 1995–96 that preferred internal pacification to any agreement with the Palestinians. In practical terms, 32 of the 42 disputed outposts were declared legal, and the settlers’ journal Nekuda published a paean to Barak in the February 2000 issue. ²