Action

Abstract

In this short chapter, I want to turn to consideration of the idea that there’s an intimate and important connection between knowledge and action. Many will feel that it’s not possible to do justice to this topic in such a short space. They are quite right; books could be, and indeed have been, written on this topic (see Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005; and Fantl and McGrath 2009). Much of the interest in the theses about the relationship between knowledge and action to be discussed stems from the role that they play in debates between those who think that practical considerations, such as how much is at stake, play a role in determining whether a true belief counts as an item of knowledge, and those who think that only the kinds of factors traditionally recognized as epistemic — factors tied closely to the truth of propositions — can play this kind of role. Much recent epistemology has been focused on this issue, and it would be impossible to do it justice here. In not engaging with this topic on this occasion, I do not mean to slight its interest or significance; for a helpful and recent overview, see Fantl and McGrath (2011).