The Rungs of the “Ethical” Ladder

Abstract

In his famous letter to Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein writes:

… the point of the book is ethical. I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are not in it, which, however, I’ll write for you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and I’m convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited this way. In brief, I think: All of that which many are babbling today, I have defined in my book by remaining silent about it. Therefore the book will, unless I’m quite wrong, have much to say which you want to say yourself, but perhaps you won’t notice that it is said in it. For the time being, I’d recommend that you read the foreword and the conclusion since these express the point most directly.¹

Some of the themes in this letter do not come as a surprise for those familiar with the Tractatus and its peculiar relation to ethics. From the beginning, we meet the groundbreaking claim in Wittgenstein’s thought that there can be no ethical propositions, and following this statement we encounter the demand to remain silent.