Scepticism and the “Nature” of Naturalized Epistemology

Abstract

We have been operating under the provisional assumption that the Hume-as-sceptic interpretation is antithetical to the Hume-as-naturalist one. As we have seen, many operate under this assumption.¹ If Loeb is correct that a naturalistic project such as Hume’s presupposes that induction produces justified beliefs (Loeb 2006, 321), then it is easy to see why this assumption is so prevalent. After all, when Hume pursues his naturalistic project, on this construal he is assuming that the results of the project are inductively justified and thus have epistemic merit. So although he never explicitly claims “I am not a sceptic”, the whole tenor of his project defeats whatever he appears to assert when he discusses sceptical arguments. The time is ripe, then, to challenge the idea that naturalism and scepticism are incompatible in this way.