Belief without Evidence

Abstract

Even if I.iv.i gives an explicit, detailed argument for epistemic egalitarianism that begins with arguing that “all knowledge degenerates into probability” (1.4.1.1, 180) and concludes that we end up with “…a total extinction of belief and evidence” (T1.4.1.6, 183), it is unlikely that the sceptical interpretation of Hume would have ever been so widely held if he appeared to endorse scepticism only in this particular section of the Treatise. That is, Hume presumably endorsed scepticism in other parts of the Treatise, as Hume himself intimates when he claims in the Abstract “ …that the philosophy contained in this book is very sceptical” (T Abstract 27, 657; emphasis added). This chapter explores some of the other very relevant passages that contribute to an understanding of Hume as an epistemic egalitarian. Interestingly, many of these passages concern Hume’s treatment of belief. As the last chapter showed, Hume’s ideas about belief are important for understanding the target of Hume’s reductio in I.iv.i. Moreover, we need an in-depth discussion of Hume’s theory of belief to explain more fully why Hume does not recommend suspending all belief (i.e., that he does not endorse D-scepticism) despite the iterative probability argument. Consequently, I look carefully at the connection between Hume’s views on belief and scepticism.