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The Cash-Flow Risk of Corporate Market Investments

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Advances in Financial Risk Management

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Abstract

Over a long span of time, US aggregate risk has decreased while the risk for US nonfinancial corporations (or firms) has increased substantially.1 This general finding has been observed using sales (Comin and Mulani, 2006), stock returns (Campbell et al., 2001) and cash flows (Irvine and Pontiff, 2009) in addition to earnings,2 employment and capital investment (Comin and Philippon, 2005).

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Authors
  1. Craig O. Brown
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

    Jonathan A. Batten

  2. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong

    Peter MacKay

  3. Department of Business and Economics, University of Passau, Germany

    Niklas Wagner

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© 2013 Craig O. Brown

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Brown, C.O. (2013). The Cash-Flow Risk of Corporate Market Investments. In: Batten, J.A., MacKay, P., Wagner, N. (eds) Advances in Financial Risk Management. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137025098_2

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