The Limits of Relative Internalism

Abstract

Relative views of practical reasoning are plausible because they intuitively explain how a reason belongs to, and can come to motivate, an agent. Because relative reasons are aligned so closely with desires, which are often taken to be either contrary to or outside the scope of reason, relative views have the heavy burden of providing a normative gap between reasons and the very desires they are relative to. Without that gap, it is not at all clear how a relative reason could guide or constrain action and not merely cause it. Relative reasons can seem like introspective thoughts about the desires one already has, which leaves proponents of relative views in the position of having to explain why one should satisfy one’s desires. After all, just because an agent has a desire, does not mean that he should satisfy it, and he will most likely admit this to himself in cases where he feels he is being tempted to do something that he should not do.