Voting Mechanism Design: Modeling Institutions in Experiments

Abstract

In this chapter, I argue why laboratory experiments have the potential to become an indispensable tool of political engineering. Political engineers are concerned with the design of mechanisms, or political institutions and procedures (for example, electoral systems), that support desirable behavior and outcomes. Of course, what is desirable depends on the perspective of the decision maker (for example, a government, party or dictator). My focus is on the design of voting mechanisms for small groups which are concerned with the welfare and equality of income among their members. Other possible applications of mechanism design in political science include, but are not limited to, constitutions, fighting terrorism, conflict bargaining and environmental agreements. Although still relatively neglected in political engineering, laboratory experiments have become an established mechanism design tool in other areas, most notably auction and market design (for example, FCC combinatorial spectrum auctions, Brunner et al., 2010; Goeree and Holt, 2010; and CO₂ emissions markets, Burtraw et al., 2011). Experts in laboratory experimentation and game theory are often consulted to design these institutions, or to develop bidding strategies for firms that participate in trading. There is no reason why this could not happen in political engineering!