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Voting Behavior and Political Institutions: An Overview of Challenging Questions in Theory and Experimental Research

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Book cover Experimental Political Science

Part of the book series: Research Methods Series ((REMES))

Abstract

Voting and committee decisions can be considered the two core elements of the democratic political process. By voting, the members of a constituency determine whom they entrust as representatives with the right to decide on their behalf. By voting, the members of a committee decide which course of action they will take collectively. Hence, voting determines both the input and the output of politics, or in other words, the way in which individuals contribute to a collective outcome. We cannot, however, infer policy from the distribution of individual preferences but in very simple constellations because the chosen policy depends on the interaction between different voters who may have heterogeneous preferences and form different coalitions. These issues have been the main topic of the spatial theory of politics. The role of this chapter in this volume is to give readers some understanding of the broader context of the experiments described in subsequent chapters.

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Authors
  1. Bernhard Kittel
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  2. Kamil Marcinkiewicz
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Vienna, Austria

    Bernhard Kittel (Professor of Economic Sociology) (Professor of Economic Sociology)

  2. Ruhr University Bochum, Germany

    Wolfgang J. Luhan (Assistant Professor) (Assistant Professor)

  3. New York University, USA

    Rebecca B. Morton (Professor of Politics) (Professor of Politics)

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© 2012 Bernhard Kittel and Kamil Marcinkiewicz

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Kittel, B., Marcinkiewicz, K. (2012). Voting Behavior and Political Institutions: An Overview of Challenging Questions in Theory and Experimental Research. In: Kittel, B., Luhan, W.J., Morton, R.B. (eds) Experimental Political Science. Research Methods Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137016645_2

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