Abstract
In many political science laboratory experiments, subjects participate in the same treatment over time, participate in multiple treatments over time or make choices sequentially. The subjects may engage in these tasks either within the same session or in sessions that are separated by days, weeks or even months. In this chapter, I discuss the reasons that experiments are designed to involve such multiple experiences over time, I point out the advantages and disadvantages and I provide recommendations on ways to minimize the problems. I illustrate how such experiments are conducted using some examples from my own research and those of other experimentalists.
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© 2012 Rebecca B. Morton
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Morton, R.B. (2012). Using Time in the Laboratory. In: Kittel, B., Luhan, W.J., Morton, R.B. (eds) Experimental Political Science. Research Methods Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137016645_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137016645_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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