Constant Interpretation

Abstract

The language of this recent discussion of the status of the Shari‘a in today’s world was influenced by the times that made the discussion itself possible. One of the factors that condition the current debate is that it takes for granted an assumption that should and will itself likely be debated anew. Many scholars of Islam are increasingly more comfortable speaking of “interpretation” as the essence of law in Islam. This language may as well describe contentions and debates about other systems of law and legal theory (I am thinking of the Anglo-American legal systems, dealing with H. L. A. Hart’s Concept of Law and Donald Dworkin’s Matter of Principle and Law’s Empire).¹ True, the extent to which “interpretation” is seen as the central and most significant fact of American law’s evolution varies, and the meaning and value of interpretations of the law also vary. For example, while acknowledging the existence of good and bad interpretations, Dworkin’s belief in the integrity of the American legal system leads him to argue that, over all, the evolution of the system has been through reasonable interpretations of its foundation. Justice Scalia (in his Tanner Lectures, published under the title “A Matter of Interpretation”),² hardly in agreement with many of Dworkin’s basic stances in reading and participating in American jurisprudence, heaps scorn on this attitude of “constant interpretation” as a legitimate exercise for the judges participating in the American legal system in order to argue for continuity based on text.