Abstract
The explanationist view I have defended maintains that propositional justification consists in a subject’s overall explanatory position. There is no purely autonomous justification that provides a subject with autonomous reasons, whether from experience or intuition. Rather a subject has justification for a claim only if that claim is part of a virtuous explanatory view which beats relevant competitors. One final challenge to this view comes from Bayesianism.
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© 2014 Ted L. Poston
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Poston, T. (2014). Bayesian Explanationism. In: Reason and Explanation. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137012265_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137012265_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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