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Contemporary Challenges in Regulating Global Crises pp 1–27Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Hierarchy and Governance: Of Shadows or Equivalence?

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Part of the book series: International Political Economy ((IPES))

Abstract

The regulation of global crises sounds like a contradiction in terms. If ever there was an era of crisis worldwide, man-made and natural, it is now. At the same time, as global warming, epidemic poverty and disease, international financial meltdown, populations on the move and the erosion of self-determination and privacy reveal, regulatory strategies are failing the challenge. Then why attempt to address crisis with regulation at anything more than an aspirational level?

Bad regulation … can do terrible damage to people. Good regulation can control problems that might otherwise lead to bankruptcy and war, and can emancipate the lives of ordinary people. Mediocre, unimaginative regulation that occupies the space between good and bad regulation leads to results that are correspondingly between the extremes of good and bad. Regulation matters, and therefore the development and empirical testing of theories about regulation also matter.1

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Notes

  1. Braithwaite, J., Coglianese, G. & Levi-Faur, D. (2007) ‘Can Regulation and Governance Make a Difference: Editor’s Introduction’, Regulation & Governance 1/1: 1–7, at p. 4.

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  3. As well summarised in Börzel, T. & Risse, T. (2010) ‘Governance without a State: Can It Work?’, Regulation & Governance 4/2: 113–134.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Singapore Management University, Singapore

    Mark Findlay (Professor of Law, Professor of Criminal Justice)

  2. University of Sydney, Australia

    Mark Findlay (Professor of Law, Professor of Criminal Justice)

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© 2013 Mark Findlay

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Findlay, M. (2013). Hierarchy and Governance: Of Shadows or Equivalence?. In: Contemporary Challenges in Regulating Global Crises. International Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137009111_1

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