Abstract
Before the American invasion into the ancient land between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, Iraq constituted the quintessential rogue state. It exceeded each of the established criteria. Externally, its behavior was alarming. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq attacked two neighbors, threatened others, sponsored terrorism abroad, pursued weapons of mass destruction, and perennially destabilized the Persian Gulf region. Internally, Hussein (a pathological monster) crushed dissent, murdered potential rivals, and savagely exterminated thousands of Kurdish and Shiite citizens, some with chemical weapons. If other rogue regimes did not consciously adopt Iraq’s pushing the envelope of accepted state behavior, Hussein did anticipate theirs. Until he tempted fate too far and it bit back, the Iraqi dictator excelled in taunting the United States.
If Saddam Hussein rejects peace and we have to use force, our purpose is clear. We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
—William J. Clinton
For all who love freedom and peace, the world without Saddam Hussein’s regime is a better and safer place.
—George W. Bush
Baghdad is determined to force the Mongols of our age to commit suicide at its gates.
—Saddam Hussein
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Notes
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© 2012 Thomas H. Henriksen
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Henriksen, T.H. (2012). Iraq: Quintessential Rogue State. In: America and the Rogue States. American Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137006400_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137006400_3
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