Territorial Exclusion and Its Boundaries

Abstract

In the preceding chapter I addressed the case for democratic inclusion. I argued that the pervasiveness of territorial law, on the one hand, and its morally controversial nature, on the other, provide a strong case for enfranchising resident aliens. In this chapter, I will shift the focus from (resident) immigrants to recipient societies. Do these societies have the right to exclude would-be immigrants and, if so, on what basis? The argument that I will make in this chapter purports to show that the right to exclude non-forced migrants¹ can be justified on the grounds that it is functionally related to collective self-determination. At the core of the argument lies the value of collective self-determination and its effective territorial implementation. The term ‘collective self-determination’ is used in contradistinction to national self-determination to refer to the citizens of a state with no distinction of cultural or religious affiliation. My understanding of collective self-determination is meant to be compatible with moral cosmopolitanism.