Abstract
Many epistemologists hold that an agent can come to justifiably believe that p is true by seeing that it appears that p is true, without having any antecedent reason to believe that visual impressions are generally reliable. Certain reliabilists think this, at least if the agent’s vision is generally reliable. And it is a central tenet of dogmatism (as described by Pryor (2000) and Pryor (2004)) that this is possible. Against these positions it has been argued (e.g. by Cohen (2005) and White (2006)) that this violates some principles from probabilistic learning theory. To see the problem, let’s note what the dogmatist thinks we can learn by paying attention to how things appear. (The reliabilist says the same things, but we’ll focus on the dogmatist.)
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© 2012 David Jehle and Brian Weatherson
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Jehle, D., Weatherson, B. (2012). Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty. In: Restall, G., Russell, G. (eds) New Waves in Philosophical Logic. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137003720_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137003720_7
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