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Diversification, Diversity and Systemic Risk in European Banking

  • Pierluigi Morelli
  • Giovanni B. Pittaluga
  • Elena Seghezza
Chapter
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Part of the Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions book series (SBFI)

Abstract

The recent financial crisis has revealed the unexpected fragility of financial systems in the industrialized countries. The process of national deregulation that started in the 1980s led to an intense process of consolidation of financial institutions. Consequently, both in the United States and in Europe, the degree of concentration in banking systems increased significantly.

Keywords

Stock Return Total Asset Systemic Risk Stock Prex European Central Bank 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Pierluigi Morelli, Giovanni B. Pittaluga and Elena Seghezza 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierluigi Morelli
  • Giovanni B. Pittaluga
  • Elena Seghezza

There are no affiliations available

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