Conclusion

Abstract

The military coup in September 1973 offered an ailing and uncertain right an opportunity which had never before presented itself and was unlikely to do so again. After decades of relative electoral failure, ideological stagnation and a lack of definition, and political defensiveness, the Chilean right recognized the possibilities of influencing, without dominating, the country’s new political masters, the military. Lacking both a long-term project and the experience to carry one out, the armed forces were seen as the inocentes vis-à-vis the grandiosos of the traditional right-wing parties. Having failed under democracy, the right now hoped to succeed under an authoritarian system of government. This was the challenge which it accepted all too readily. What emerged after 1973, however, was a ‘new right’. The old, traditional conservatives and liberals, under the guise of the now disbanded Partido Nacional, were unable, or unwilling, or simply too passive, to adapt to the new reality facing the country. As a consequence, they were quickly and ruthlessly overshadowed and marginalized by groups which themselves had, prior to the insurrection, been on the sidelines of Chilean political and cultural life.