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Russian Strategy towards the Abkhaz Conflict

  • Chapter
Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS

Abstract

Russian strategy towards Georgia differs from the Moldovan case in four respects. First, Russian forces in Abkhazia intervened over a prolonged period of time, clearly under the command of the MoD. Second, ‘peacekeeping’ forces were deployed in Moldova at a point only advantageous to Russian interests. In Georgia, Russian forces were deployed only after Russian interests had been secured. Third, Shevardnadze’s desire for a rapprochement with Russia has been a determining factor for the success of Russian strategy. Finally, Russian strategy has been more proactive towards Georgia, mainly because of the importance of Russian interests in this region.

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Notes and References

  1. For a brief overview of the political, economic and military situation in Georgia, see Report of CSCE Rapporteur Mission to Georgia (CSCE Communication No. 186, Prague, 29 May 1992). It is important to note that the Abkhaz conflict coincided with the South Ossetian conflict and the civil war that broke out in western Georgia in 1993. These conflicts, combined with the break-up of the Soviet economic system, led to economic collapse in Georgia, as well as a severe humanitarian crisis with a total of 280 000 internally displaced persons. These crises placed tremendous pressure on the already overtaxed and disintegrating Georgian state.

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  2. See Stephen Jones (1993) ‘Georgia: A Failed Democratic Transition’, in Nations and Politics in Soviet Successor States, pp. 291–4.

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  3. For background, see Suzanne Goldenberg (1995) Pride of Small Nations, pp. 81–115; and Elizabeth Fuller (1992) ‘Abkhazia on the Brink of Civil War?’, RFE/RL RR, 4 September, pp. 1–4. It is not unusual in the North Caucasus for the titular nationality to represent a minority in its own republic. John Colarusso (1995) ‘Abkhazia’, Central Asian Survey (vol. 14, no. 1), p. 76. See also ‘The United Nations and Georgia’ (Reference paper, April 1995).

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  4. Stephen Jones (1993) in Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, p. 294.

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  5. See Jonathan Aves’ (1996) discussion of different regions making up the ‘little empire’ of Georgia, in Georgia: From Chaos to Stability? (London: Former Soviet South Project, RIIA).

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  6. Stephen Jones (1993) in Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, p. 302.

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  7. The Military Balance, 1992–1993 estimated about 3000. William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric (1995) Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, CentralAsia and the Transcaucasus, p. 85–6 estimated between 7000–12 000.

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  8. Jane’s Sentinel: Russia and the CIS (1996), pp. 4–10 to 4–13.

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  9. See the account in ‘Your Disarmament Results - Not One Army but 17’, Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 11 June 1993, p. 5, in JPRS UMA-93–031, PP. 1–4.

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  10. Odom and Dujarric (1995) Commonwealth or Empire?

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  11. Richard Woff (1993) ‘The Armed Forces of Georgia’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (July), pp. 307–10.

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  12. The Military Balance, 1993–1994, p. 80.

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  13. ‘Blessed are the Peacemakers’, Novoye Vremya, June 1993, pp. 8–12, in JPRS UMA-93–024, pp. 22–6.

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  14. ‘Your Disarmament Results - Not One Army but 17’, Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 11 June 1993, see note 10.

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  15. According to Dmitry Trof imov, an agreement between Grachev and Kitovani in October 1991 sealed Gamsakhurdia’s fate, with the Russian MoD transferring military equipment in exchange for a Georgian acceptance of an enduring Russian military presence.

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  16. Roy Allison (1993) Military Forces in Soviet Successor States, p. 66. See also The Military Balance, 1993–1994, pp. 81, 106. The Russian GFTC was estimated at about 20 000 in total, with about 5500 in Armenia.

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  17. Russian forces in Abkhazia were commanded by V. Sorokin in the crucial period of Russian intervention between November 1992 to March 1993. Roy Allison included Sorokin in the ‘peacekeeping clique’ in Moscow, with Grachev, Kondratyev, Gromov and Lebed; see Allison (1996) in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 271.

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  18. The Russian envoy to Georgia, Vladimir Zemsky, affirmed that these factors were not linked to the GFTC command; see interview, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 December 1992, p. 1. However, Dmitry Trof imov noted the long-standing and close relationship between Deputy Defence Minister

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  19. Kondratyev and Viktor Kakalia, Abkhaz Defence Minister from August to November 1992 (thereafter military adviser to Ardzinba)—as the basis for support to the Abkhaz forces by Russian forces deployed in Abkhazia; in Hans-Georg Erhart, Anna Kreikeyer and A. V. Zagorsky (eds) (1996), Crisis Management in the CIS, p. 81.

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  20. Pavel Felgengauer argued in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7 November 1993, p. 3, that ‘either Russia controls the Caucasus or the Caucasus will control Russia’.

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  21. See the discussion of a`Yugoslav’ scenario by Arkady Ostalsky, Izvestiya, 18 January 1992, p. 1; and A. Vasiliyev, New Times (20/92), pp. 4–6.

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  22. ‘Russia’ TV programme, 11 March 1992, SU/1328, B/2–3.

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  23. 23 See, for example, statements by the then Deputy Prime Minister Georgy Khizha on these points, Itar-Tass, SU/1476, C1/5.

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  24. See report on Mayak Radio programme, Moscow, 24 August 1992, SU/1469, C3/1.

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  25. ‘Russia’ Radio programme, Moscow, 19 August 1992, SU/1465, C2/2.

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  26. MFA Deputy Boris Pastukhov later admitted to the CSCE Rapporteur that ‘unfortunately, Russia did not pay attention to this conflict in time. Russian foreign policy could not foresee the development of the political situation in Georgia’; see ‘Report of Personal Rapporteur’ (1993), (CSCE Communication), pp. 3–4.

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  27. Rutskoi met with the heads of the regions and republics of the North Caucasus in late August. Gayaz Alimov, Izvestiya, 25 August 1992, P. 1.

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  28. See Agreement in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (17–18, 1992), pp. 13–16.

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  29. According to David Darchiashvili, the T-55 tanks and SU-15 planes were of low quality. See unpublished paper, ‘Russian—Georgian Military Relations’, August 1996, p. 2.

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  30. See Nodar Broladze et ai_, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 August 1992, pp. 1, 3.

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  31. Itar-Tass, 31 August 1992, SU/1475, C1/3. The government’s reaction to the conflict also came under ‘centrist’ and ‘radical’ criticism within Russia, from the Civic Union, Sergei Baburin and Viktor Aksyuchits, for the delay in Russian policy. See discussion in Catherine Dale (1996) ‘The Case of Abkhazia (Georgia)’, in Peacekeeping and Russia’s Role in Eurasia, pp. 124–5.

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  32. See Nodar Broladze, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 April 1992, p. 2.

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  33. Kozyrev, Izvestiya, 30 June 1992, p. 3.

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  34. On these ‘first principles’, see the statement by Russian parliament, Itar-Tass, 25 September 1992, SU/1497, C2/1; the statement by Deputy Premier Sergei Shakhrai, Ostankino, Ch. 1 TV programme, Moscow, 20 June 1993, SU/1721, B/4–5; the statement by Yeltsin, Itar-Tass, 7 December 1992, SU/1558, B/6; account of MoD position in talks with Georgia, Interfax, 19 March 1993, SU/1643, B/5; and Kozyrev statement on ‘Russia’ TV programme, Moscow, 9 June 1993, SU/1713, B/12–13.

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  35. In the spring of 1993, under intense internal pressure, because of Russian coercive intervention, Shevardnadze did call for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Abkhazia, but not from Georgia as a whole.

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  36. See analysis in S. F. Jones (1995) ‘Adventurers or Commanders? Civil—Military Relations in Georgia Since Independence’, in Civil— Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, pp. 35–52.

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  37. Interview with Shevardnadze, Izvestiya, 19 December 1992, in SU/1572, B/10–11, 24 December 1992.

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  38. Shevardnadze on Mayak Radio programme, Moscow, 11 January 1993, SU/1585, B/3–4.

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  39. A small UN Observer Mission was deployed in Georgia in November 1992 to help ‘promote negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia which are aimed at reaching a peaceful political settlement’. Eduard Brunner was the Secretary General’s Special Envoy. In February 1994, the UN Mission numbered 88, increasing to 134 in 1995. In parallel, the CSCE also sent a small mission to Georgia in early 1993, under Istran Gyarmati. This mission has played a secondary role to the active UN presence. The CSCE decided to send a small mission in November 1992, on the basis of the ‘Report of the Personal Rapporteur’, (CSCE, October 1992).

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  40. Marrack Goulding letter to Ardzinba on 2 July 1993. Cited in Jewett and Hill (1994) Back in the USSR, p. 53.

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  41. Grachev, cited in Mark Smith (1993) Pax Russica, p. 54.

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  42. See, for example, interview with Georgian military adviser, Lieutenant-General L. Sherashenidze in Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 May 1992. Moreover, military negotiations continued during this period on the status of Russian forces with progress even in September 1993. See the account of Pyotr Karapetyan, Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 September 1993, p. 1.

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  43. Shevardnadze stated that these units constituted their ‘own military state in the conflict zone’, Itar-Tass, 5 October 1992, SU/1505, Cl/1. The Russian Envoy argued that these forces performed a`peace mission’. See Pyotr Karapetyan, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 December 1992, p. 1.

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  44. See account in Jewett and Hill (1994) Back in the USSR, pp. 51–4. See MoD Declarations on these events in Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 and 23 March 1993.

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  45. See an account of the attack by Pyotr Karapetyan, Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 September 1993.

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  46. Elena Glebova has argued that the Abkhaz received Russian support in the form of thirteen train wagons of military equipment; in Moskovskiye Novosti, 13 October 1993, p. 13. Erhart, Kreikmeyer and Zagorsky (1996) argued that Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev ordered Russian forces to support the Abkhaz of fensive in September 1993, in Crisis Management in the CIS, p. 247. If these reports are true, they may present evidence of a lack of coordination in the MoD command, as it seems that Grachev had no desire to bring Georgia to the edge of total collapse.

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  47. Vice Premier Sergei Shakhrai accused the Abkhaz of exploiting the cease-fire, and pledged to apply pressure on the Abkhaz leadership. See Vasily Kononenko, Izvestiya, 22 September 1993, p. 2. Chernomyrdin imposed immediate financial and economic sanctions against Abkhazia, and the border was closed. See Besik Urigashvili, Izvestiya, 22 September 1993, pp. 1, 2.

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  48. See the discussion in Irakli Tseretli (1996) ‘Seeking Stability under Shevardnadze’, Transition, (6 July), pp. 42–5.

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  49. Igor Giorgadze, the Security Minister, fled to Moscow after the ‘terrorist’ acts in Tbilisi in August 1995. Following this, the Georgian Security Services were purged. Moreover, in early 1995, Tengiz Kitovani was arrested for attempting to attack Abkhazia. Kitovani went on trial in December 1995 and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment; see Mikhail Vignansky, Segodnya, 10 October 1996, p. 7. Ioseliani has been accused of illegal arms sales.

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  50. See Diplomatichesky Vestnik (5–6/1994), pp. 32–41; and Aleksandr Pelts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 February 1994.

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  51. An initial agreement was reached in March between Grachev and Nadibaidze, before being finalized by Chernomyrdin in a visit in September 1995; see Vitaly Denisov and Aleksandr Pelts, Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 March 1995, p. 1.

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  52. Still, in February 1995, Georgia signed the Collective Security Concept, and the agreement on the Main Directions of Collective Security and the Agreement of the creation of a Joint Air Defence System. See the discussion in David Darchiashvili (1996) Russian—Georgian Military Relations (August), p. 6.

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  53. Lieutenant-General Boris Dyukov of the GFTC stated that these ‘strategic’ forces were the ‘plenipotentiary representative of Great Russia’; Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 April 1994, p. 2.

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  54. In mid-1996, Grachev announced the decision to create coalition forces with Georgia and Armenia, and the GFTC; Vitaly Denisov and Pyotr Karapetyan, Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 May 1996.

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  55. See Segodnya, 14 February 1996.

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  56. In a report to the Security Council on 25 January 1994, Boutros-Ghali presented two options. First, the UN would deploy 2500 troops across Abkhaz territory to restore order and ensure the safety of returning IDPs. The second option would consist of a multinational deployment, including Russian troops, which UNOMIG would monitor. As subsequent reports made clear, the Secretary General favoured the second option. See discussion in ‘The UN and the Situation in Georgia’ (Reference Paper, April 1995).

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  57. See report on Georgian Radio programme, Tbilisi, 6 May 1994, SU/192, B/10–11. In a report on 3 March 1994 to the Security Council, the Secretary General argued that the UN was ‘already over-extended’, and that it would be ‘ill-planned to take on an additional commitment’; cited in P. Taylor and K. Smith (1996) Peacekeeping and Russia’s Role in Eurasia, p. 204.

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  58. The agreement ‘On the Cease-Fire and Demarcation of Security Zones’, provided for CIS forces with UN oversight; see Diplomatichesky Vestnik (11–12, 1994), p. 47.

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  59. These forces are deployed at forty-five checkpoints on both sides of the Inguri river, including at special heavy weapon withdrawal zones and with special patrol duties in the Kodor Valley. See the discussion in ‘Operations Involving the Use of the Armed Forces in the CIS’, (1995) unpublished paper, Centre for Political and International Studies (Moscow, May).

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  60. Georgian Radio programme, Tbilisi, 13 June 1994, SU/2022, F/4–5. Boutros-Ghali stated that the CIS—UN ‘peacekeeping’ cooperation in Abkhazia was a`further step in the new direction of cooperation in peacekeeping activities between UN and regional organizations and alliances’; cited in P. Taylor and K. Smith (1996) Peacekeeping and Russia’s Role in Eurasia, p. 201. In a report to the Security Council in 14 October 1994, Boutros-Ghali considered this cooperation to be ‘satisfactory’.

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  61. Se the report on Georgian Radio programme, Tbilisi, 15 July 1994, SU/2051, F/3. UNOMIG was created in late August 1993, during the Sochi cease-fire, with 88 military observers and 55 civilian observers. In December, 1993, the Security Council had recommended the gradual deployment of 50 more observers. However, active combat continued on the ground throughout this period. The expanded mandate of UNOMIG included oversight of the CIS operation, verification of troops and weapons withdrawal, monitoring the Kodori Gorge, where Georgian forces remained, and contributing to the safe return of refugees. The Mission was deployed in three sectors (Gali, Zugdidi and Sukhumi). See MacFarlane, Minear and Shenfield (1996). A Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, pp. 52–3.

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  62. The two operations are technically independent, providing formally for interaction at various levels on the ground. See UN Security Council resolutions in ‘The UN and the Situation in Georgia’ (Reference Paper, April 1995). However, as noted by Neil S. MacFarlane, Larry Minear and Stephen Shenfield (1996) A Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, UNOMIG has had limited access to the sectors within the Security Zone, p. 58.

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  63. See the discussion in Neil S. MacFarlane (1997) ‘On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia’s Civil Wars’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 509–25.

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  64. See Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 20 July 1994, p. 1.

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  65. See Memo from talks, December, in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (1–2/1994), p. 38. Also, Itar-Tass, 1 December 1993, SU/1862, F/2.

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  66. Diplomatischesky Vestnik (9–10, 1994), pp. 53–7. See the account of talks in January in Geneva, in Diplomatichesky Vestnik (3–4, 1994), pp. 43–4.

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  67. In Moscow in April 1994, the two parties had agreed on a ‘Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons’. In this, the parties pledged to cooperate with Russia and the UNHCR to guarantee the safe return of refugees. Little actual progress was made on the ground on this issue, however. In late September, the Abkhaz authorities accepted only 100 applications for return. 400 000 refugees fled Abkhazia during the war, according to the UNHCR, with 250 000 displaced persons within Georgia — the majority of whom are Georgian. See R. Redmond (1994) ‘Conflict in the Caucasus’,After the Soviet Union (no. IV, 1994), pp. 22–5. The presence of these refugees has placed great strain on the Georgian central government; see UNHCR, Information Bulletin, (July 1994), pp. 4–7. After an initial attempt to force the pace of IDP return in 1994, the UNHCR has since been forced to retreat to its original humanitarian mandate. A further agreement in February 1995 secured a timetable only for the voluntary return of refugees. See the discussion in MacFarlane, Minear and Shenfield (1996); A Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping.

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  68. According to the ‘peacekeeping’ forces, 85 per cent had returned to the Security Zone by late 1996; Iberia, Tbilisi, 1 November 1996, SU/2761, F/6.

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  69. Scc Georgian TV programme, Tbilisi, 26 November 1995, SU/2473, F/4–7. For an example of Ardzinba’s position, see Interfax, 28 November 1995, SU/2474, F/2.

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  70. See comments by Zhvaniya in Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 September 1996, p. 3. Parties not represented in parliament have been the most outspoken against the Russian operation, and Russia’s overall military presence. In August 1996, fourteen opposition parties formed a commission calling for the total withdrawal of Russian troops.

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  71. Interfax, 4 April 1995, SU/2271, F/3. Shevardnadze called ‘peacekeeping’ ‘senseless’ in its present state, Segodnya, 23 February 1996, P. 9.

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  74. See Nodar Broladze, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 March 1997. Two regiments will be withdrawn, including the 345th Airborne Regiment in

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  75. Gudauta. The GFTC has been subordinated to the NCMD, and these forces are to be reduced by 70 per cent.

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  76. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 January 1997, p. 3.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of War Studies, King’s College London, University of London, UK

    Dov Lynch (Lecturer)

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© 2000 Royal Institute of International Affairs

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Lynch, D. (2000). Russian Strategy towards the Abkhaz Conflict. In: Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333984215_7

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