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The Evolution of Foreign Policy towards the ‘Near Abroad’

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Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS

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Abstract

In order to understand ‘peacekeeping’ as an instrument of Russian strategy, it is necessary to discuss the wider context of the Foreign Ministry’s (MFA) approach towards the former Soviet Union. A consensus has emerged since 1993 which has lent foreign policy a degree of coherence. Russian policy towards the ‘near abroad’ in 1992 could be described as an empty vessel, characterized by ill-defined generalities. The shift that occurred was not so much a radical one as a gradual filling of the vessel, with the formulation of a more detailed policy. The MFA shifted from benign neglect to deep engagement in the CIS region. Initially, the former Soviet Union was delinked from broader Russian foreign policy, but with the passage of time and the pressure of events, the positions of the ‘near abroad’ and ‘far abroad’ have shifted. The focus of Russian foreign policy has become more inward-out, concentrating as a priority on the former Soviet Union.

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Notes and References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of War Studies, King’s College London, University of London, UK

    Dov Lynch (Lecturer)

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© 2000 Royal Institute of International Affairs

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Lynch, D. (2000). The Evolution of Foreign Policy towards the ‘Near Abroad’. In: Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333984215_3

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