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The Politicisation of Difference: Does this Make for a More Intolerant Society?

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Toleration, Identity and Difference

Abstract

Generally, to be the object of tolerance is a welcome improvement on being the object of intolerance, but typically people do not wish themselves or their actions to be the object of either.2

I am grateful to John Horton for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

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Notes

  1. John Horton, ‘Toleration as a Virtue’, in David Heyd (ed.), Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 35.

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  2. Robert Paul Wolff, ‘Beyond Tolerance’, in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore Jr. and Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969) p. 61.

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  3. John Horton, ‘Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration’, in J. Horton (ed.), Liberalism Multiculturalism and Toleration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993) p. 3.

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  4. Joseph Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, Dissent (Winter 1994) 68.

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  5. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) p. 191.

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  6. Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann et al., Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition’ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

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  7. Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, p. 25.

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  8. As in my own arguments in The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

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  9. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); also ‘Justice and Communicative Democracy’, in Roger Gottlieb (ed.), Radical Philosophy: Tradition, Counter-Tradition, Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993) pp. 123–43.

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  10. Seyla Benhabib, ‘Democracy and Difference: Reflections on the Metapolitics of Lyotard and Derrida’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1994) p. 21.

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  12. Bhikhu Parekh, ‘The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political Philosophy’, Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1990) 704.

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  14. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 55.

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  15. In his ‘A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen’, reprinted in Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), Walzer argued that the requirement for political involvement would crowd out all those other things - taking long walks, playing with children, painting pictures, making love, just watching TV - that we also want in our lives.

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  17. Hannah Arendt, ‘Freedom and Politics’ (1960), reprinted in David Miller (ed.), Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 61.

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  18. See, for example, the essays collected in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

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  21. Amy Gutmann, ‘Introduction’ in Amy Gutmann et al., Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition’ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 7.

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  22. See for example, the argument in Peter Gardner, ‘Propositional Attitudes and Multicultural Education, or Believing Others are Mistaken’, in J. Horton and P. Nicholson (eds.), Toleration: Philosophy and Practice (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992).

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  25. Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Discourses on National Identity’, Political Studies Vol. 42, No. 3 (1994) 503.

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  26. Cited in Ronald Dworkin ‘The Great Abortion Case’, New York Review of Books, 29 June 1989.

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  28. Catharine MacKinnon, ‘Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade’, in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987) p. 93.

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  30. Sunstein notes that governments never impose an obligation on parents to devote their bodies to their children - even when what is at issue is a risk-free kidney transplant that could save the life of the child. ‘Neutrality in Constitutional Law’, p. 34.

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  31. Jean L. Cohen, ‘Redescribing Privacy: Identity, Difference, and the Abortion Controversy’, Columbia Journal of Genderand Law, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1992) 99.

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  32. Ibid., p. 100.

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  33. Ibid., p. 84.

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  34. In Rights Talk (New York: Free Press/Macmillan, 1991), Mary Glendon suggests that it would be better to deal with controversial issues through the political process, rather than through unilateral constitutional rulings. ‘As if there were no public debate before, during, and after Roe,’ is Jean Cohen’s exasperated comment. ‘Redescribing Privacy’: 72n.

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  35. Ruth Fletcher, ‘Silences: Irish Women and Abortion’, Feminist Review, Vol. 50 (1995).

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  36. Ibid., p. 57.

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  37. Nancy Fraser, ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a “Post-Socialist” Age’, New Left Review, Vol. 212 (1995) 78.

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© 1999 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Phillips, A. (1999). The Politicisation of Difference: Does this Make for a More Intolerant Society?. In: Horton, J., Mendus, S. (eds) Toleration, Identity and Difference. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333983379_7

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