Abstract
Between 1975 and 1981 Bangladesh’s foreign policy was given a new identity. This was partly the contribution of the leader at that time, Ziaur Rahman, who came to power on 7 November 1975. As noted in Chapter 1, both internal and external influences on a state’s foreign policy need to be taken into consideration, so the identification and evaluation of the significance of both the domestic and external forces at work is required. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the ways in which long-term domestic political, cultural and economic pressures in Bangladesh, themselves inextricably interwoven, have combined with specific domestic political events, such as Ziaur Rahman’s rise to power, and have influenced the relationship between Bangladesh and India.
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Notes and References
For a summary of the reasons why Mujib’s popularity plummeted, see L. Jenkins, ‘The Sins of the Father’, Newsweek, August 25, 1975, p. 11.
The August 1975 coup against Mujib was carried out by disgruntled elements in the military, although the Majors who killed Mujib were ‘used as pawns by more sophisticated political forces’, L. Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution, London, 1979, p. 102. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that those forces would have participated in the coup if Mujib had continued to receive popular support. It is therefore not surprising that Zia went to considerable lengths to cultivate mass appeal.
The ‘four pillars’ espoused by Mujib and the principles upon which the 1972 Bangladesh constitution was based were: nationalism, secularism, socialism and democracy. These principles followed closely the four principles attributed to Jawaharlal Nehru of India: democracy, socialism, secularism and non-alignment. Nehru’s, and hence Mujib’s understanding of a ‘secular’ state was essentially one in which religious minority groups would have equal rights with the majority religious group. See M. Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, London, 1959, p. 621. It did not necessarily imply that the Indian or Bangladesh governments should not be based on religious principles.
C.H. Bateman, ‘National Security and Nationalism in Bangladesh’, Asian Survey, vol. 19, no. 8, August 1979, p. 781. According to ‘numerous reports’, Pakistani military equipment worth about US$50 million was taken back to India.
See M. Rashiduzzaman, ‘Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints and External Fears’, in M.M. Khan and H.M Zafarullah (eds), Politics and Bureaucracy in a New Nation: Bangladesh, Dacca, 1980, p. 193.
L. Lifschultz, New Delhi’s ‘views’ on the Dacca Coups’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1975, p. 17.
Zillur Khan explores the process of politicisation of the armed forces in Pakistan, and subsequently Bangladesh, being stimulated particularly by the need to aid the civil administration during crises such as floods, famines and epidemics. Z.R. Khan, ‘Politicization of the Bangladesh Military: A Response to Perceived Shortcomings of Civilian Government’, Asian Survey, vol. 21, no. 5, 1981, pp. 551–64.
A.G. Noorani, India, the Superpowers and the Neighbours: Essays in Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1985, p. 55.
J. Uyangoda, ‘Indo—Bangladesh Relations in the 1970s: Bangladeshi Perspectives’, in S.U. Kodikara (ed.), South Asian Strategic Issues: Sri Lankan Perspectives, New Delhi, 1990, p. 67.
C.P. O’Donnell, Bangladesh: Biography of a Muslim Nation, Boulder, 1984, p. 212.
See New York Times, November 18, 1975. According to A. Mascarenhas, the leader of the abortive November 3 coup, Khalid Musharraf, was unfairly accused of attempting a ‘sell-out to India and restoring a Mujibist government in Bangladesh’, but did nothing to dispel the charge. A. Mascarenhas, Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood, 1986, pp. 104–5.
L. Lifschultz, ‘The Crisis Has Not Passed’, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 5, 1975, p. 30.
Wright, Bangladesh: Origins and Indian Ocean Relations (1971–1975), Sterling, 1988, p. 154.
The Fifth Amendment to the Bangladesh Constitution, passed on 5 April 1979, contained many checks on the sovereignty of the parliament. In particular, it validated all proclamations and martial law orders given since 15 August 1975 and retained controversial aspects of Mujib’s Fourth Amendment to the constitution by which an all-powerful presidential form of government had been introduced. See A. Hague, ‘Bangladesh 1979: Cry for a Sovereign Parliament’, Asian Survey, vol. 20, no. 2, 1980, p. 221. See also The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh: As Modified up to 28th February, 1979 [Dacca] [n.d.], p. 23. The military dominance of the elected National Assembly has been pointed out by Zillur Khan, who states that 30 per cent of the representatives were ‘informers of the military regime’.
Z.R. Khan, Leadership in the Least Developed Nation: Bangladesh, Syracuse, 1983, p. 149.
For details of the socialist character of the Bangladesh liberation movement, see: T. Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1975, pp. 47–55. Maniruzzaman points out that the political orientation of those who fought in the war shifted to a position which was further left than that of the regular Awami League. See p. 49.
This statement was part of Taher’s testimony delivered between 12 and 15 July in Dhaka Central Jail to the Special Martial Law Tribunal which sentenced him to be executed on the 21 July. See L. Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution, p. 87. For the first publication of Taher’s last testimony, see L. Lifschultz, ‘Abu Taher’s Last Testament: Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution’, Economic and Political Weekly ( Bombay ), Special Number, August 1977, pp. 1303–53.
E. Ahamed, ‘Dominant Bureaucratic Elites in Bangladesh,’ in M.M. Khan and H.M. Zafarullah, Politics and Bureaucracy in a New Nation: Bangladesh, Dacca, 1980, p. 150.
It has been pointed out that Zia’s Islamic emphasis was not of an extreme nature because it was based on the backlash against the discredited Awami League’s secular rule rather than the rise of extreme Islamic fundamentalism. See D.A. Wright, ‘Islam and Bangladeshi Polity’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, December 1987, p. 21.
Traditionally, the Islam practised in rural Bangladesh was of a more liberal form, being Sufi and Indic-influenced. See D. Walker, ‘Islam and Nationalism in Bangladesh’, Hamdard Islamicus, vol. 14, no. 2, 1991, p. 39.
S. Oren, ‘After the Bangladesh Coups’, The World Today, vol. 32, no. 1, January 1976, p. 21.
A. Roy, ‘The Bengal Muslim “Cultural Mediators” and the Bengal Muslim Identity in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’, South Asia, vol. 10, no. 1, 1987, p. 28.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, External Resources Division, ‘Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh’ (as of June 30, 1981), pp. 20–2 and pp. 26–76, cited in M.M. Khan and S.A. Husain (eds), Bangladesh Studies: Politics, Administration, Rural Development and Foreign Policy, Dhaka, 1986, p. 251. See also The 1979 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, Dacca, p. 346. Most of the aid came from Saudi Arabia.
H. Evans, ‘Bangladesh: South Asia’s Unknown Quantity’, Asian Affairs, New Series, vol. 19, October 1988, p. 309.
Wright, ‘Bangladesh: Foreign Policy For the 1980s’, Bangladesh Bulletin, vol. 14, 1987, p. 22–3.
D.A. Wright, ‘Destructive Features of Bangladeshi Political Life’, Probaho, vol. 1, no. 3, 1991, p. 23.
See L. Ziring, ‘Pakistan and India: Politics, Personalities, and Foreign Policy’, Asian Survey, vol. 18, no. 7, 1978, p. 711, and L. Ziring (ed.), The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbors, and the Great Powers, New York, p. 116.
R. Sobhan, The Crisis of External Dependence: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid to Bangladesh, London, 1982, p. 125.
H.A. Kissinger, ‘Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy’, in J.N. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, New York, 1969, p. 272.
B. Buzan et al., South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, New York, 1986, pp. 7–8.
According to Lawrence Ziring, approximately 26 coup attempts occurred during Zia’s rule, culminating in his assassination by a disgruntled military officer in May 1981. See L. Ziring, Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad–An Interpretive Study, Oxford, 1992, pp. 140–1.
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© 2000 Kathryn Jacques
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Jacques, K. (2000). 1975–81: Military Ascendancy in Bangladesh. In: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333982488_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333982488_5
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