Congress and Missile Nonproliferation

Abstract

The enactment of Section 17 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for financial year 1991 signalled the culmination of a three-year process during which Congressional concern with missile proliferation increased sharply. Congressional concern had been fed by the increasing vulnerability of US forces and allies to a growing number of states in possession of such capabilities, and was exacer-bated by a perception the MTCR was ridden with flaws. The most prominent of these flaws was deemed to be the regime’s lack of an international enforcement agency, and each member state’s responsibility for implementing their commitments through their own national authorities. This situation was deemed to have resulted in the failure of several West European governments to properly enforce the MTCR guidelines and contributed to several high-profile cases of missile proliferation in South America and the Middle East. Congressional concern over the effectiveness of the MTCR was fuelled by the legislature’s lack of an opportunity to oversee the negotiation and ratification of the regime during the 1980s because it was a purely executive branch initiative.