Abstract
We have seen the construction of a global manufacturing system in which advanced capital is freed from ties to any particular national state. The operations of the world market dramatically reduce the economic autonomy (the ability to control, regulate and plan) of national states.
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Notes
W. W. Rostow: The Stages of Economic Growth (3rd edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. xiii.
Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, New York: Harper and Row, 1986, p. 330.
Foreign trade was nationalized (in the Decree of 22 April 1918) well before industry and internal trade (E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Volume 2, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971, p. 129). Timothy Luke points out the continuing role of foreign technology in the first Plan, but concludes that this was ‘A one-time-only importation of much advanced technology [which] would enhance physical production and also promote the autarkic goals of the Soviet leaders.’ (‘Technology and Soviet Foreign Trade’, International Studies Quarterly, 31 (3), September 1985, pp. 340–2.) See also Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Industry from Stalin to Gorbachev, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 214, 251.
N. A. Kaniskin, ‘The Western Manager and the Soviet Director’, Problems of Economics, 33 (11), March 1991, pp. 87–98 at p. 89.
IMF, Study, Volume 1, p. 18; Volume 2, p. 68; Susan M. Collins and Dani Rodrick, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the World Economy, Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1991, p. 40.
For a post-Soviet estimate of the magnitude of that share, see ‘After the Fall’ (extracts from a report commissioned by the Gaidar government — unsigned) in Delovie Lyudi, June 1992, pp. 44–7. See Tony Cliff, State Capitalism in Russia, London: Bookmarks, 1988, p. 222.
A. Ageev and D. Kuzin, ‘Sotsializm i predprinimatel’stvo: problemy sovmestimosti’, Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 3, March 1990, pp. 58–69 at p. 63.
V. Lopatin, ‘Armiya i ekonomika: ekonomicheskie aspekty vennoi reformy’, Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 10, October 1990, pp. 4–12 at p. 6.
V. Amelin: ‘Smogut li otraslevye ministerstva sta’ subyektami innovatsii?’, Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 10, October 1990, pp. 25–32 at p. 31.
Quoted in Anders Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform, London: Pinter Publishers, 1989, p. 16.
Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR 1917–1991, London: Penguin, 1992, p. 389; IMF, Study, Volume 1, pp. 11–12
Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of the USSR, Number 2, 1984, p. 12.
Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of the USSR, No. 1, 1984, p. 8.
Chris Harman, ‘The Storm Breaks’, International Socialism, No. 46, Spring 1990, pp. 3–93 at pp. 50–1.
Mike Haynes, ‘Class and Crisis — the Transition in Eastern Europe’, International Socialism, No. 54, Spring 1992, pp. 45–105 at p. 50.
David Granick, The Red Executive, London: Macmillan, 1960, p. 243.
Axel Leijonhufvud, ‘The Nature of the Depression in the Former Soviet Union’, New Left Review, No. 199, May/June 1993, pp. 120–6 at p. 121.
Josef C. Brada, ‘Soviet-Western Trade and Technology Transfer’, pp. 3–34, in Bruce Parrott (ed.), Trade, Technology and Soviet American Relations, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985 at p. 29
Henry S. Rowan et al., Defence Conversion, Economic Reform and the Outlook for the Russian and Ukrainian Economies, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 89.
Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle, pp. 15–17. One effect of the decline in Soviet exports relative to those of the NICs was that in the late and post-Soviet periods, the NICs — particularly Singapore and South Korea–became something of a role model for Soviet/Russian reformers. They have shown a particular interest in the role of state intervention in these economies — which, I would argue, is an index of the extent to which these reformers do not understand the implications of globalization. For a pre-collapse Soviet view see Ewa Berard-Zarzicka, ‘The Authoritarian Perestroika Debate’, Telos, No. 84, Summer 1990, pp. 115–36.
Quoted by I. Iudin, ‘Ekonomicheskie aspekty sokrashcheniia vooruzhennykh sill i konversii voennogo proizvodstva’, Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 6, June 1989, pp. 48–53 at p. 49.
Harry Gelman, Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Military Institution, Adelphi Papers, No. 258, Spring 1991, p. 7.
Leonid Brezhnev, Report of the Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow: Novosti, 1971, pp. 95–6.
M. S. Gorbachev, ‘Korennoi vopros ekonomicheskoi partii’, Pravda, 12 June 1985. In the first two years of the Gorbachev administration, military spending continued to grow faster than the economy (see Nikolai Ryzhkov in his report to the Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989; Documents and Materials, Moscow: Novosti, 1989, p. 74).
Ed Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1988, p. 219.
Alex Callinicos, The Revenge of History, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, p. 44.
V. Loginov, ‘Est’ li vykhod iz krizisa?’, Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 4, April 1990, pp. 3–14 at p. 4. See also Ryzhkov at the Congress of People’s Deputies on the diversion of ‘the best specialists, the most up-to-date technologies, equipment and critical resources much needed in other areas’ to the MIC (Documents and Materials, Moscow: Novosti, 1989, p. 52).
See ‘After the Fall’, Delovie Lyudi, p. 45. See also K. Gonchar, ‘The Economics of Disarmament — A Difficult Matter’, Problems of Economics, 33 (9), January 1991, pp. 76–90 at p. 76.
Hewett, Reforming, p. 218; see also Elliott R. Goodman, ‘Gorbachev Takes Charge: Prospects for Soviet Society’, Survey, 39 (2), Summer 1985, pp. 180–201 at p. 185. How this was done was explained by (inter alia) Robert Campbell: ‘… these sectors have the kind of independence that enables them to exert initiative and to be more innovative. They face heightened demands and have access to resources required to get things done’ (‘Management Spillovers from Soviet Space and Military Programmes’, Soviet Studies, 23 (4), April 1972, pp. 586–608 at p. 606); and Gyorgy Markus, ‘… East European economies perform better the more centralized and less differentiated the demand they have to meet. It is for this reason that they have their highest achievements in the military field…’ (‘Planning the Crisis’, Praxis International, No. 3, 1981, pp. 240–57 at p. 256).
Boris Kagarlitsky, The Dialectic of Change, London: Verso, 1990, p. 342.
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1993, p. 73.
Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998
Jonathan Alford (ed.), The Impact of New Military Technology, Westmead: Gower, 1981.
Quoted in Adam Buick and John Crump, State Capitalism, London: Macmillan, 1986, p. 95.
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© 2000 David Lockwood
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Lockwood, D. (2000). Globalization and the Soviet State. In: The Destruction of the Soviet Union. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333981566_5
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