The Limits of Ideology: US Foreign Policy and Arab Nationalism in the Early Cold War

Abstract

In recent years, some historians have begun to interpret US foreign policy in the context of an American ‘ideology’. Rather than focus exclusively or primarily on geopolitics, economics or diplomatic or military strategies, these authors have interpreted US activity through a framework of ‘negative’ beliefs such as anti-communism and racism and, more rarely, ‘positive’ values, such as freedom and democracy. These approaches have been invaluable in cutting through the facade of ‘national security’, the catchall phrase leading to many justifications of US conduct, and the movement to glorify figures such as Dwight Eisenhower. They have extended the critiques of scholars such as William Appleman Williams and engaged with theorists ranging from Friedrich Nietschze to Noam Chomsky. Most significantly, the application of ‘ideology’ has provided the first comprehensive explanation of US policy towards Eastern Europe in the early Cold War, treating ‘liberation’ not as a rhetorical flourish of the 1952 presidential campaign but as a policy objective dating from 1948.¹