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The Creation of the Soviet Presidency: Social Chaos and Executive Power, 1989–1991

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The Russian Presidency
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Abstract

Although Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the R ussian S oviet F ederated S ocialist R epublic in June 1991, he took office under the shadow of another presidency barely older than his own. L ittle more than a year earlier, the S oviet C ongress of P eople’s deputies had elected M ikhail G orbachev the first “president of the USSR ,” a new office that represented the first independent executive post in S oviet history. A lthough it may have seemed another step on the road to a changed, democratic S oviet U nion— a newly formed legislature had chosen the nation’s first independent president—it was in fact an act of desperation. U ntil 1990, the theory and practice of governing the S oviet U nion had been predicated on the explicit rejection of the very idea of separated powers, or even of classical models of parliamentarism.1 B ut that was before perestroika had gone awry, and S oviet society had descended into chaos and violence. G orbachev’s post was created as a reaction to this turmoil and growing fear, conditions that would be bequeathed to the R ussian presidency (and its counterparts elsewhere in the C ommonwealth of I ndependent S tates) when the S oviet government finally imploded. T he S oviet president was the first, but not the last, in this region, and the lessons of G orbachev’s doomed experiment would not be lost on Yeltsin or the Russians as the Union crumbled about them and power made its inexorable way from the president of the USSR to the presidents of the republics.

Either we create presidential power or chaos triumphs. This is our choice.

—an unnamed “government source” in Pravda, 1990

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Notes

  1. See, for example, I. M. Stepanov, “Parlamentskaia demokratiia i vybor formy pravleniia” in Konstitutsionnyi stroi rossii, 2nd. ed. (Moscow: Institute of State and Law, 1995), and V. N. Suvorov, “Institut prezidentsva: rossiiskaia konstitutsionnaia model’ i zarubezhnyi opyt” in Ispolnitelnaia vlast: sravnitelno-pravovoe issledovanie (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1995).

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  2. Among the best documentary accounts of the final days of the USSR in English are a trio ofworks by journalists: David Renmick, Lenins Tomb (New York:Vintage, 1994), David Satter, Age of Delirium (NewYork: Knopf, 1996), and Michael Dobbs, Down with Big Brother:The Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York: Knopf, 1997).

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© 1999 Thomas M. Nichols

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Nichols, T.M. (1999). The Creation of the Soviet Presidency: Social Chaos and Executive Power, 1989–1991. In: The Russian Presidency. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780312299088_2

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