Skip to main content

Coercive Diplomacy

  • Chapter
  • 33 Accesses

Abstract

THIS CHAPTER ON COERCIVE DIPLOMACY defines this strategy as a combination of credible military power and diplomatic commitments in the process of coercion. While political hawks would use credible threats in order to compel actors to comply, doves would persuade them to comply via reassurance. A balanced policy would use threats when appropriate and reassurance when necessary.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  • Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 4–7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elliot Aronson, Timothy Wilson, and Robin Akert, Social Psychology: The Heart and the Mind (New York: Harper Collins, 1994).

    Google Scholar 

  • Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph Nye, Hawks, Doves, and Owls (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), 206–22. In addition to these three, others scholars have used the hawk–dove framework. See also Fred Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 60–61, for his analysis of hawks and doves. Ikle defines hawks as those who engage in treasonous adventurism instead of terminating the fighting: in search of peace with honor, they fight too much and for too long. Doves are those who give aid and comfort to the enemy by retreating in the face of aggression: in a quest for peace at any cost, they would fight too little and for too short a time.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 357.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 1999 Raymond Tanter and John Psarouthakis

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tanter, R., Psarouthakis, J. (1999). Coercive Diplomacy. In: Balancing in the Balkans. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780312292829_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics