Abstract
CONSIDER THE BALKANS AS A LABORATORY for exploring ideas about globalism and tribalism as well as about circumstance and choice. The application of Western diplomacy and force to the regional warfare in the Balkans offers an opportunity to test propositions about how to overcome ethnicity in the race for peace and security.
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Notes
The American negotiating team, led by Richard Holbrooke, selected the Wright–Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, in order to hold talks among the parties to the Bosnian Conflict. See Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 203–205.
One approach within the field of cognitive psychology is prospect theory. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 263. For an application in political science, see Jack Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” in Barbara Farnham, ed., Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 7–22.
A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984), 496–526.
Ze’ev Maoz, “Resolve, Capability, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 (June 1983), 195–229; Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard E. Koch Jr., “Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War,” International Politics and Foreign Policy, James N. Rosenau ed., (New York: Free Press, 1961), 469–482.
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1966). Also see, Ze’ev Maoz, “Resolve, Capability, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 (June 1983), 195–229. Maoz holds that, “the willingness and ability to expose the civilian population to enemy strikes is an indicator of resolve. So is, however, the willingness to inflict punishment on civilians. The two are connected because once you decide to attack the opponent’s population, you run a higher risk of getting your own civilians hit,” from an electronic mail message to Raymond Tanter, June 24, 1998, the Baker Institute of Public Policy Rice University, Houston, TX. In a related vein, Steve Rosen discusses “cost–tolerance,” which may be interpreted as a willingness of a regime to expose its population to harm, that is, the degree of that regime’s resolve. See Steve Rosen, “War Power and the Willingness to Suffer,” in Bruce Russett, ed., War, Peace, and Numbers (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972), 167–183.
Noel Malcolm, Kosovo a Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998), chapter 1. Also see, Anna Husarska, “Blood Feud,” New York Times (August 9, 1998). A book review of Noel Malcolm, Kosovo a Short History and Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian a History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
Jack Snyder, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 155. For an elaboration for the offense/defense nexus, see Robert Harkavy, Preemption and Two–Front Conventional Warfare (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Papers on Peace Problems, 1977), 8. Harkavy distinguishes between preemptive attack and preventive war. In preemption, the threatened actor places a premium on offensive action, but in prevention, that actor does not perceive striking the first blow as crucial. In a decision to launch a preventive war, “What is important is the forestalling of a change in the balance of power;” Robert Harkavy, Preemption and Two–Front Conventional Warfare, 7 [emphasis in original].
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© 1999 Raymond Tanter and John Psarouthakis
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Tanter, R., Psarouthakis, J. (1999). Combat, Coercion, and Cooperation. In: Balancing in the Balkans. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780312292829_1
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