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The External Factors

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Abstract

In addition to the internal factors, there are important external factors outside the scope of the PKO that can have a critical impact on the chances for success of peacekeeping. These factors can be influenced by the UN but cannot be completely controlled by it. First and foremost among them are the parties to the conflict and the degree to which they are committed to the peace process. The parties in a civil war may have spent years negotiating a peace treaty but are unlikely to trust each other. Reaching permanent peace requires them to surrender, or at least put at risk, real power. Political, economic, and military power are given up, or at least suspended, through demobilization, elections, and other elements of the peace process.

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Notes

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© 1999 Dennis C. Jett

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Jett, D.C. (1999). The External Factors. In: Why Peacekeeping Fails. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780312292744_6

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