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The Last Trump

Anti-Egyptian Propaganda from ‘Omega’ to the Eisenhower Doctrine
  • James R. Vaughan
Part of the Cold War History Series book series (CWH)

Abstract

This chapter examines the propaganda and psychological warfare techniques employed against Egypt in the period from the creation of the Baghdad Pact through to the 1956 Suez Crisis and the enunciation of the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’ in January 1957. From September 1955 to July 1956, the perception of a growing Egyptian threat acted as a unifying force within Anglo-American relations in the Middle East. The identification of Nasser as the major obstacle to the pursuit of Western objectives and the bid to forge a joint policy to counteract his influence signified a major attempt to bring British and American policies back into line. Nevertheless, even before the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956 and the Anglo-American schism that followed, it was apparent that British and American policy makers held very different views of what Nasser was a threat to and what the best means of countering his activities were. Rightly or wrongly, both Britain and the US had come to see Egypt as the chief obstacle to an Arab-Israeli settlement. At the same time, however, the main source of British hostility to Nasser was the belief that he was seeking to undermine British influence in Iraq, Jordan and the Persian Gulf. It was this idea of Nasser as an ‘Arab Mussolini’ bent upon the elimination of British influence in the Middle East that convinced Eden that the Egyptian President was a mortal danger to British interests who had to be broken.

Keywords

Middle East Middle Eastern Radio Station Arab World Suez Canal 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 61.
    Lucas, ‘The Missing Link? Patrick Dean, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee’, Kelly & Gorst (eds.), Whitehall and the Suez Crisis (London: Frank Cass. 2000). p. 123.Google Scholar
  2. 62.
    See, in particular, Pearson, Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis. Reluctant Gamble (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).Google Scholar
  3. 74.
    Rawnsley has unearthed intriguing evidence that the man who later confessed to responsibility for the broadcasts from France, Mahmoud Abu Al-Fath, also claimed the initial impetus for the station had come from Nuri Said. This raises the possibility of a link between the French ‘Free Egypt’ in 1956 and the ‘Free Egypt’ broadcasts believed to have been organised by Iraq in 1955 (Rawnsley, ‘Overt and Covert: The Voice of Britain and Black Radio Broadcasting in the Suez Crisis, 1956’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July 1996), p. 514.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 208.
    See Rathmell, Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle For Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996);Google Scholar
  5. Little, ‘Cold War and Covert Action: the United States and Syria, 1945–58’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 51–75;Google Scholar
  6. Jones, ‘The “Preferred Plan”: The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert Acrion in Syria, 1957’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 401–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© James R. Vaughan 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • James R. Vaughan

There are no affiliations available

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