Abstract
This chapter examines how Western propagandists faced up to the challenge of the Arab-Israel dispute, perhaps the single greatest political obstacle to the successful pursuit of British and American psychological objectives in the Middle East. From the post-war crisis in Palestine through to the efforts to promote an Arab-Israeli peace settlement in the mid-1950s, the pernicious influence of the conflict was felt in almost every branch of the information and cultural diplomacy programmes in the region. The chapter first examines British and American propaganda during the 1945–49 period of crisis and war in Palestine, highlighting the paralysis that afflicted the State Department’s information programme and exposing the very different approach taken by British propagandists. A second section investigates Western propaganda in the early 1950s, the period in which it became apparent that Israel had established itself as an enduring feature of the political landscape. In particular, it examines the rhetorical strategies of silencing, distancing and neutralism that Anglo-American propagandists sought to apply to politically sensitive issues. A third section explores Western propaganda in support of attempts to engineer a long-term Arab-Israeli settlement, focusing upon the difficulties involved in forging a joint Anglo-American approach to the questions of publicity that arose in relation to the ‘Alpha’ peace plan.
Mr Warner’s comment that ‘Palestine bedevils our entire programme’ requires no comment. If Palestine ‘bedevils’ British programs, I am at a loss to find a word for what it does to the American counterparts of these programs.
Gillespie Evans, Public Affairs Officer (USIS Cairo), 8 June 1948
I cannot avoid the fear that the Israeli issue is in a fair way to losing us the Middle East. It stands in the way of co-operation between the Arab countries and the West in matters of defence and it poisons our relations to such an extent that we are impotent to counter the Communist advance.
Evelyn Shuckburgh, Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary, 15 December 1954
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Notes
Readers unfamiliar with the topic should consult excellent accounts such as: Cohen , Palestine and the Great Powers (1982);
Pappe , Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948–51 (1988);
Ovendale , Britain, the United States and the End of the Palestine Mandate (1989);
Levey , Israel and the Western Powers, 1952–1960 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997);
Hahn , caught in the Middle East. U.S. Policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1945–1961 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
NAPRO, FO 1110/327/PR58/47/G, Houstoun-Boswall to Murray, 19 August 1950. The ‘moral’ aspect of British pro-Arab sentiment is intelligently dissected in Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 114–18.
Morris , Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
Shamir, ‘The Collapse of Project Alpha’, in Owen and Louis (eds), Suez 1956. The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 85.
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© 2005 James R. Vaughan
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Vaughan, J.R. (2005). The Less Said the Better. In: The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945–1957. Cold War History Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230802773_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230802773_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-52418-1
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