The Men and Machinery

Building the Middle Eastern Propaganda Instrument
  • James R. Vaughan
Part of the Cold War History Series book series (CWH)

Abstract

The British and American propaganda machines that emerged after 1945 were sprawling and complex entities. Indeed, the number of governmental and private actors involved makes any analysis of Western propaganda during the Cold War impossible without first presenting an overview of the responsible agencies. This chapter examines how the transition from the Second World War to the Cold War transformed the West’s approach to mass persuasion and dictated the shape and organisation of the post-war propaganda instrument in the Middle East. The first section examines the changing role of propaganda after the end of the Second World War and the renewal of large-scale overseas propaganda programmes in the early Cold War. The second examines how these post-war propaganda machines were adapted for operations in the Middle East. A final section investigates the extent to which British and American propagandists succeeded in pooling their resources and engaging in joint operations in the Middle East.

Keywords

Propa Syria Turkey Arena Egypt 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© James R. Vaughan 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • James R. Vaughan

There are no affiliations available

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