Abstract
There exists a large body of evidence documenting an unsatisfactory record of implementation of IMF conditionality by borrowing countries.1 A large proportion of IMF programmes are not successfully completed, with non-completion being not an indicator of graduation from the Fund but rather one of future referrals (or recidivism).2 Specifically, the IMF has recently come under criticism for allowing some countries to establish long-term relationships, while, according to its original mandate, the Fund can only guarantee temporary assistance.
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Marchesi, S., Sabani, L. (2007). Prolonged Use and Conditionality Failure: Investigating IMF Responsibility. In: Mavrotas, G., Shorrocks, A. (eds) Advancing Development. Studies in Development Economics and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230801462_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230801462_17
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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