Transatlantic Differences on Security Perceptions and Responses

Abstract

‘Americans are warmongers. Europeans are wimps.’ These widely held but erroneous perceptions of the United States and the European Union provide the background to a steady unravelling of the previous transatlantic consensus on security threats and how to respond to them. The crisis of 2002/03 in transatlantic relations was the most traumatic in post-World War II history. It centred on how to respond to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It pitted Washington, London, Warsaw (and for a time Madrid) against Berlin and Paris (and Moscow). German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder won re-election on an anti-American war ticket in October 2002. Some of the largest anti-war demonstrations in European history took place in February 2003. The crisis shook NATO and the EU to their very foundations. How did these transatlantic differences arise? What are the prospects for future US-EU agreement on security threats and the appropriate responses, in particular responses involving the use of force? To what extent has the second Bush Administration learned lessons from the Iraq War? What are the implications for the future of the EU and NATO? How will the EU advance its security ambitions after the failure to ratify the constitutional treaty? This chapter seeks to examine the nature of the transatlantic rift on security, focusing on respective security strategies, and suggests that while the gap has narrowed, there remain substantial differences in approach that will affect future EU-US relations.