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Historical Discord in Transatlantic Competition Relations

Institutional Differences and Self-Interested Actors
  • Chad Damro
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

If Lord Wilberforce is correct, then a state of Keohanian discord should be commonplace in most, if not all, international competition relations. States have different interests and, therefore, will disagree with one another over individual competition cases. Such a state of discord seems an appropriate characterization of historical transatlantic competition relations. In fact, the discord was so prevalent, both the United States and European states established institutions to support their own interests against ‘attacks’ from other states.

Keywords

Competition Policy Federal Trade Commission Competition Authority Merger Control Merging Firm 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Parisi introduces this comment as ‘the obligatory footnote in a paper on this subject’ (1999, 133), citing remark in the House of Lords Judgment in re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation [1978] A.C. 547, 617.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Chad Damro 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chad Damro
    • 1
  1. 1.University of EdinburghUK

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