Abstract
If Lord Wilberforce is correct, then a state of Keohanian discord should be commonplace in most, if not all, international competition relations. States have different interests and, therefore, will disagree with one another over individual competition cases. Such a state of discord seems an appropriate characterization of historical transatlantic competition relations. In fact, the discord was so prevalent, both the United States and European states established institutions to support their own interests against ‘attacks’ from other states.
It is axiomatic that in antitrust matters the policy of one state may be to defend what it is the policy of another state to attack.
Lord Wilberforce, British House of Lords (1978)1
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Notes
Parisi introduces this comment as ‘the obligatory footnote in a paper on this subject’ (1999, 133), citing remark in the House of Lords Judgment in re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation [1978] A.C. 547, 617.
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© 2006 Chad Damro
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Damro, C. (2006). Historical Discord in Transatlantic Competition Relations. In: Cooperating on Competition in Transatlantic Economic Relations. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230800861_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230800861_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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