The EEC Application

Abstract

Looming larger than events in the Congo, a key component of the crisis of interdependence that came together in the winter of 1962–3 was the failure of the British application to join the EEC. In Harold Macmillan’s mind, this application had been conceived in the wake of the collapse of the Paris summit of May 1960 as a means to maintain Britain’s international economic and political position in the face of the unreliability of the Anglo-American alliance. As such it was an exercise in the hedging of bets. That Macmillan should have chosen the EEC course by 1961, when one looks back to the beginning of his premiership, is somewhat surprising. In fact, in his early years as prime minister, Macmillan proved to be at best a reluctant European. Coming to office in the aftermath of the Suez crisis, it is arguable that he might have chosen a European rather than an Anglo-American path for Britain in foreign affairs. After all, one reading of the Suez crisis was that ‘European’ cooperation in the shape of the Anglo-French collusion with the Israelis had provided the only means by which Britain could defend her position in the face of American unreliability.